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THE RATE of national  saving  in the United States declined  precipitously 
in the 1980s.  From World  War  II to 1980  the net saving  rate averaged  8 
percent  of national  income;  today the rate is just 2 percent. While  much 
public  discussion  has focused on the growth  in the federal  budget  deficit 
as a source of this decline, a larger  part  of the drop  in saving  has come 
from  a falloff  in the rate  of private  saving. 
The extent of decline  in the private  saving  rate  is a surprise  for several 
reasons. The slide comes after several decades in which the saving  rate 
fluctuated  within a very narrow  range. The narrowness  of that range 
inspired  many  economists to treat  the private  saving  rate as an uninter- 
esting constant. Second, the largest  part  of the decline occurred,  ironi- 
cally, after  the government  made  an increase  in saving  a major  objective 
of economic policy and redesigned  the tax system to increase effective 
after-tax  rates of return  and promote saving. Finally, the decline coin- 
cided  with  a dramatic  increase  in real  market  interest  rates, which  should 
have greatly  strengthened  saving  incentives. 
Economists have no shortage of theories to explain the decline in 
saving. Given the previous stability  of the saving  rate and the one-time 
nature  of the decline, however, it is virtually  impossible  to sort out the 
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conflicting  explanations  on the basis of macroeconomic  data  alone. This 
paper  reports  on some empirical  explorations  of household  survey data 
to determine  if microeconomic  analysis  can provide  any insight  into the 
source of the decline. Specifically,  we use the survey data to evaluate 
the validity  of some recent  explanations  for reduced  saving. 
An ideal data  set would contain  information  from  a panel survey  that 
followed a representative  group  of households  continuously  throughout 
the period  of the decline. No such survey  data  currently  exist.  ' Thus  we 
have explored a second approach--comparing  similar surveys con- 
ducted before and after the collapse in private saving. To supplement 
the analysis of U.S. data, we consider results from similar  microeco- 
nomic surveys in Canada and Japan, where private saving has also 
declined.  Although  this approach  does not permit  us to follow individual 
households, we  can observe the change in saving behavior among 
households with similar  characteristics.  Among the potential  explana- 
tions that we examine for the saving decline are changes in the demo- 
graphic  structure  of the  population,  changes  in  the  distribution  of income, 
and the influence  of capital  gains  in real-estate  and  financial  assets. 
Aggregate Trends in Saving 
The magnitude  of the decline in U.S. saving  is shown in table 1. Most 
numbers in the table are drawn directly from the national income 
accounts (NIA). However, we have reclassified the accumulation  of 
reserves in the funded  pension programs  of state and local government 
employees. In the national accounts the accumulation  of reserves in 
state and local pension plans is classified as government saving. We 
believe the  accumulation  seems more  analogous  to similar  accumulations 
in private pension programs, which are classified as the saving of 
workers.  The pension contributions  on behalf  of state and  local govern- 
ment employees raise compensation  and pension wealth in the same 
fashion as the contributions  to private pension plans. In the table we 
therefore  count state and  local pension accumulations  as part  of private 
1. The  Survey  of Consumer  Finances  does contain  information  on  wealth  accumulation 
from  a sample  of households  over two intervals,  from 1983  to 1986  and  from 1986  to 1989. 
Unfortunately,  these data  do not permit  us to analyze  the sample's  saving  behavior  during 
the period before the early 1980s when household saving was comparatively  high. 
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Table 1.  Annual Rates of Net Saving and Investment, United States,  1951-90 
Percent 
Item  1951-60  1961-70  1971-80  1981-85  1986-90  1990 
Total national  saving 
(investment)  8.0  8.4  7.7  3.7  2.0  1.7 
Net  saving 
Private  savinga  8.6  9.5  9.6  8.1  6.3  5.6 
Government  saving  -0.7  -  1.0  -2.0  -4.5  -4.0  -4.0 
Net  investment 
Net domestic  investment  7.7  7.7  7.5  5.0  4.8  3.4 
Net foreign  investment  0.3  0.7  0.3  -1.3  -2.8  -1.8 
Addenda 
Capital  consumption 
allowancesb  9.0  8.4  9.8  11.4  10.7  10.5 
Personal  saving  ratec  7.2  7.6  8.9  7.6  5.8  6.2 
Source: National  Income  and Product  Accounts.  Saving  and investment  rates are calculated  as a percent  of net 
national  product,  which  is equal  to gross national  product  less capital  consumption  allowances.  Thus, net saving  and 
investment,  which  are  the same  by accounting  convention,  equal  the gross  flows  less capital  consumption  allowances. 
Total  net saving  differs  from  total national  saving  by the amount  of the statistical  discrepancy. 
a. Private  saving  is the saving  of businesses  and  households.  Employee  pension  funds  of state  and  local  governments 
are measured  as household  saving  in order  to match  the treatment  of private  pension  funds. 
b. Capital  consumption  allowances  are shown  as a percent  of gross national  product. 
c. The personal  saving  rate  is shown  as a percent  of disposable  income. 
saving.2 We also report the data exclusive of capital consumption 
allowances because we are primarily  interested in the issue of wealth 
accumulation. Capital consumption allowances as a share of gross 
domestic product  (GDP)  are shown at the bottom of the table for those 
who prefer to look at gross saving. We do not present any of the 
alternatives  to the national  accounts concept of saving that have been 
calculated by  other economists. While a wide range of  defensible 
adjustments  could  be made,  other  studies  suggest  that  these adjustments 
would influence  the measured  level and cyclical behavior  of the saving 
rate but not the extent of its secular decline.3  Using our concepts, the 
overall net national saving rate has fallen by about 6 percent of net 
2. The pension  fund  adjustment  is significant,  since the annual  accumulation  of these 
reserves  increased  from  0.5 percent  of net national  product  in 1960  to 1.2  percent  in 1990. 
We did not make  a similar  adjustment  for the federal  pension  program  or social security 
old-age  pensions because they are, for the most part, unfunded  programs,  although  the 
merits  of such  an adjustment  can be argued. 
3. See, for example,  Summers  and  Carroll  (1987),  Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff  (1989),  and 
Bradford  (1990).  The major  alternatives  for defining  saving involve one or more of the 
following:  reclassifying  the net accumulation  of consumer  durables  as saving, adjusting 
the value  of the debt  owed by governments  to the private  sector  for  the effects of inflation, 
and  relying  on the data  from  the Flow of Funds  accounts.  One  exception  is the issue raised 
by Bradford  of whether  private  saving  inclusive of capital  gains has declined.  That  issue 
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national  product  (NNP), with about  half of the decline originating  in the 
government  sector and  half  in the private  sector. 
In the early  part  of the 1980s  the drop  in saving  had  little effect on the 
nation's ability to finance domestic investment because there was a 
significant  amount  of idle resources and the United States attracted  a 
surprisingly  large flow of resources from the rest of the world-the 
current  account deficit reached 3.8 percent of NNP in 1987. Recently, 
however, high  borrowing  costs and slow growth  have pushed  down the 
rate of domestic investment by about 4 percentage points, providing 
greater support for the argument  that the low supply of saving has 
crowded  out some domestic  investment. 
We have found  it useful to separate  the private  saving  rate into three 
major components: corporate saving and two types of personal, or 
household, saving-saving accumulated  inside employer-provided  pen- 
sion programs  and other "discretionary"  elements of personal  saving. 
Changes  in each of these components  are influenced  by a distinctive  set 
of factors. In addition,  the decline in the first  two components  of saving 
requires  some explanation  in view of our focus on the third  component 
in the remainder  of this paper. 
A detailed breakdown  of the sources of decline in private saving is 
shown in table 2. The most important  single source of the decline in 
private saving is the drop in retained  earnings-or  saving by corpora- 
tions. The  recent  decline  in  retained  earnings  continues  a trend  extending 
over several decades and that accelerated after 1985. The large drop 
during  the late 1980s can be traced to substantial  economic losses by 
financial  institutions-they  have had negative retained earnings since 
1985.  But, as shown in the bottom  half  of table  2, domestic corporations 
are also paying out a much larger  proportion  of their net cash flow to 
bond-  and  stockholders.  If the equity  holders  see through  the "corporate 
veil," we would expect them to compensate  for the increased payout 
rate by increasing their own rate of saving. Also in table 2, one can 
observe that  before 1980  a portion  of the decline  in business  saving  could 
be attributed  to the declining  profitability  of corporate  capital, but that 
rate of return  seems to have leveled off in the 1980s:  net cash flow as a 
percent  of gross output  and as a percent  of tangible  assets has remained 
relatively  stable.  It is also noteworthy  that  American  corporations  derive 
a major  portion  of their  retained  earnings  from  overseas operations. 
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Table  2. Components  of Private  Saving  and Determiinants  of Retained  Earnings, 
United  States, 1951-90 
Percent 
Item  1951-60  1961-70  1971-75  1976-80  198145  1986-90  1990 
Total  private  savinga  8.6  9.5  10.1  9.2  8.1  6.3  5.6 
Retained  earnings  3.0  3.7  2.6  2.8  2.0  1.6  0.7 
Rest of the world  (net)  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.7 
Domestic  financial  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.0  -0.2  -0.4 
Domestic  nonfinancial  2.2  2.9  1.5  1.7  1.4  1.3  0.4 
Personal  saving  5.5  5.8  7.5  6.4  6.1  4.7  5.0 
Private  pension  reserves  0.9  1.2  1.6  2.3  2.3  1.0  0.6 
State and local 
government  pensions  0.4  0.5  0.7  0.9  1.3  1.4  1.3 
Other  personal  4.2  4.0  5.1  3.2  2.5  2.2  3.0 
Determinants  of retained  earningsb 
Gross cash flow  25.9  25.2  22.7  24.1  23.8  23.7  23.5 
Net cash flow  17.4  16.9  13.5  13.7  12.2  12.5  12.2 
Taxes  9.2  7.2  5.9  5.9  3.9  4.4  4.2 
Dividends  3.8  3.6  2.6  2.4  2.9  3.1  3.5 
Interest  (net)  -0.2  0.6  1.8  2.1  3.2  3.3  4.4 
Retained  earnings  4.6  5.5  3.2  3.3  2.2  1.7  0.1 
Addendum 
Rate  of return  on 
nonfinancial  corporate 
capitalc  ...  6.6  5.2  4.9  5.1  5.7  ... 
Source: National  Income  and  Product  Accounts,  tables 1.14, 1.16, 5.1, 6.13, 8.8, and authors'  calculations. 
a. Private  saving  and its components  are expressed  as a percent  of net national  product. 
b. The determinants  of the retained  earnings  of domestic  corporations  are shown  as a percent  of gross corporate 
product. 
c. The rate of return  on nonfinancial  corporate  capital  is the after-tax  profits  plus net interest  payments  as a 
percent  of tangible  capital. 
ing those of state and local governments, became a major source of 
private saving after 1970, exceeding 3 percent of NNP for the period 
1975-85.  However, they are also part  of the explanation  for the decline 
in overall saving  in the 1980s.  By definition  the annual  accumulation  in 
these funds  equals  the contributions  to and  the earnings  of the funds  less 
benefit  payments.  There  has been almost no growth  in the proportion  of 
workers covered by pension plans since the mid-1960s,  but there has 
been a greatly  increased  effort  to fund  the plans' future  liabilities.4 
The 1974 Employee Retirement  Income Security Act (ERISA) in- 
creased  the probability  that workers  would actually  receive a benefit  in 
future  years, and it set a floor on funding  for defined-benefit  programs. 
Both of these factors  led to higher  employer  contributions  to the pension 
4.  See Pension  and  Welfare  Benefits  Administration  (1989,  p. 357). 188  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
funds during  the late 1970s.  With  the onset of high  interest  rates and the 
recovery of the stock market in the 1980s, however, many defined- 
benefit  plans  became overfunded  under  Internal  Revenue Service (IRS) 
definitions,  and many employers  were unable  to deduct further  contri- 
butions  when calculating  their  tax liability.  The result  was a sharp  falloff 
in contributions  to defined-benefit  plans. The combination  of employer 
contributions  and  the earnings  of the private  pension  plans  leveled off in 
the 1980s at around  4 percent of NNP. Meanwhile, benefit payments 
rose from 1.3 percent of NNP in 1980  to 3.3 percent in 1989, as more 
eligible workers reached retirement age. On balance, then, the net 
contribution  of private  pension  programs  to national  saving  has declined 
by about 1.5 percent of NNP since 1985. This downward trend will 
probably  continue  in future  years  because of recent  actions  by Congress 
to further  restrict  the funding  of the programs.5 
Meanwhile, state and local governments,  unencumbered  by federal 
regulation,  have continued  to build up their pension reserves, though 
saving  from this source will also begin to dry up in the 1990s.  Many of 
these funds  are  close to being  fully  funded  and  have matured  to the point 
where they will begin  to pay out substantial  sums  to new beneficiaries  in 
the next decade. Thus, their contribution  to national saving will also 
decline in the future. 
The  response  of defined-benefit  pension  funds  to higher  market  returns 
may provide a partial  explanation  for the failure of a higher after-tax 
return  to serve as a positive incentive to private  saving. As pointed  out 
by Douglas Bernheim  and John Shoven, defined-benefit  plans are an 
extreme example of a target saver who reduces his or her saving in 
response  to a higher  return  on existing  wealth.6 
5. A little noticed  feature  of the Omnibus  Budget  Reconciliation  Act of 1987  signifi- 
cantly revised and tightened  the criteria  defining  an overfunded  defined-benefit  pension 
plan. This revision effectively restricts  the amount  of tax-deductible  contributions  that 
can be made to a higher  percentage  of defined-benefit  plans. The likely result will be a 
further  reduction  in the reserve  accumulation  of defined-benefit  plans. 
6.  Bernheim  and  Shoven  (1988).  The  data  reported  in table  2 understate  the amount  of 
pension saving, and consequently  overstate  other personal  saving, because they ignore 
the growth  in employee contributions-particularly  to defined-contribution  plans. In an 
earlier  paper  we found  that  the addition  of employee  contributions  to such  plans  together 
with contributions  to Individual  Retirement  Accounts and Keogh plans implied that 
nonretirement  saving  of households  approached  zero  by 1987.  See Bosworth  and  Burtless 
(1990). Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  189 
The decline in the second type of personal saving, discretionary 
saving, is the focus of the remainder  of this paper. This saving, under- 
taken  directly  by households,  has declined  from  a peak of 5.1 percent  of 
NNP in the early 1970s  to a low of 2.2 percent observed over the last 
half  of the 1980s.  The trough  was reached  in 1987,  and  a partial  recovery 
has occurred  over the last three  years. Thus, the decline  in discretionary 
saving is less a phenomenon  of the 1980s  than is implied  by the overall 
total. 
Microeconomic  Survey Measures of Saving 
Microeconomic  surveys offer an alternative  to the national  income 
accounts in assessing trends in the consumption  patterns and saving 
behavior  of U.S. households. In this paper  we consider  two household 
surveys that  provide  contrasting  conceptual  measures  of family  saving. 
The Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CES) collects detailed  information 
about  family consumption  and income over the course of a year. From 
these data,  family  saving  can be calculated  as the difference  between  the 
flows of income and consumption  spending.  In contrast, the Survey of 
Consumer  Finances  (SCF)  obtains  a detailed  inventory  of family  wealth 
holdings.  By comparing  a family's  wealth  position  at two points  in time, 
we can calculate  the family's  net saving  over the period.7 
Before considering  the results from these kinds of tabulations,  it is 
important  to determine whether the decline in personal saving, so 
pronounced  in the national  accounts, will be picked up in a continuous 
household survey. Since the national  accounts and household surveys 
measure  saving in different  ways, it is not obvious that lower saving in 
the national  accounts  would  be reflected  in a household  survey. It is also 
useful to consider, at least briefly, the design and quality  of the major 
household  surveys. 
Comparing Survey Saving  with NIA  Saving 
The definitions of income, consumption, and saving used in the 
national  income  accounts  differ  in several  important  respects  from  those 
7.  For  descriptions  of the CES, see Pearl  (1978)  and  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1989). 
For descriptions  of the SCF, see Projector  and  Weiss (1966),  Projector  (1968),  and  Avery 
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used in most surveys of individual  households. It is possible, however, 
to adjust the NIA measures in a way that brings them closer to the 
concepts embodied  in the main  household surveys. After these adjust- 
ments  are made, it is straightforward  to recalculate  NIA saving  rates  for 
the past few decades in order  to determine  whether NIA saving using 
"survey concepts" follows the path of saving reported  in the national 
accounts. 
Four major  adjustments  must be made to NIA data to bring them 
closer to the saving  recorded  by household  surveys. These adjustments, 
which involve the NIA treatment  of homeownership,  employer  pension 
contributions,  net self-employment  income, and third-party  payments 
for household  consumption,  are discussed in the appendix.  (Table  Al in 
the appendix  provides  a complete  enumeration  of the adjustments  made 
to the 1989  national  accounts needed to bring  them in line with results 
from a household survey conducted the same year.) Our adjustments 
reduce both income and saving in the published  national  accounts by 
about 13 percent in 1989.8 Comparisons  of the adjusted and official 
estimates of the personal  saving rate for the period 1960-89  are shown 
in figure  1. The significant  feature  of figure  1 is the marked  reduction  of 
personal  saving  after 1975,  apparent  in both the official  and  the adjusted 
series. The reduction  began earlier in the adjusted  than in the official 
series, but the magnitude  of the decline is similar  in both. 
Household Surveys 
The U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS) has gathered  information 
on family spending  patterns  and living costs since its first expenditure 
survey in 1888-91. The primary  goal of the modern  Consumer  Expen- 
diture  Survey  is to obtain  information  about  typical  household  spending 
in order to derive expenditure  weights for the consumer price index 
(CPI). In light of this goal, the greatest emphasis in the interview is 
placed on obtaining detailed and accurate information  about family 
consumption.  In  addition,  though,  the survey  obtains  reasonably  detailed 
information  on money income and some rudimentary  data on family 
8. The proportional  size of these adjustments  has grown  steadily  over time. Because 
many  of the adjustments  affect  income  and  consumption  equally,  however,  they have far 
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Figure 1.  Alternative  Measures of the Personal Saving Rate, 1960-89 
Percent  of disposable  income 
10 
8  \  -NIA  saving 
6 
Adjusted  saving 
4 
4-. 
Pension saving  X 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
Sources:  National  Income  and Product Accounts  (NIA)  and authors' adjustments of NIA  data to convert  them to 
cash accounting  basis as described  in the text and appendix. 
wealth  holdings.  We derive  our  estimate  of household  saving  in the CES 
by subtracting  each household's reported  consumption  spending  from 
its reported  income. 
Until 1980 the survey was conducted about once every ten years; 
since 1980  it has been conducted  on a continuous  basis. Our  analysis  of 
the CES is based on data from the 1972-73 annual surveys and from 
surveys for the period 1982-85.  An examination  of the data collected in 
the 1986-89  surveys suggests that there was a noticeable  decline in the 
quality of both the income and consumption  information  reported  for 
that period, so we excluded these surveys, at least initially, from our 
analysis. In order  to keep our sample  strictly  comparable  over time, we 
also restricted the analysis to urban households, which comprise 83 
percent  of all households  and  account  for a somewhat  higher  percentage 
of total consumption. This restriction has almost no effect on our 
conclusions. In addition,  because the 1972-73  and 1982-85  surveys did 
not treat  college students  in a consistent  way, we exclude all households 
headed  by someone under  the age of 25. Again, this restriction  has little 
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As  an alternative to  the measure of  saving obtainable from an 
expenditure  survey, we have also derived  family  saving  using  a series of 
wealth surveys. While  measuring  the change  in a family's wealth  would 
seem to offer a more direct method  of ascertaining  saving than  the one 
used in a household expenditure  survey, wealth surveys are relatively 
rare and are usually regarded with great skepticism. Even though 
respondents'  recall  of consumer  expenditures  is thought  to be poor, their 
determination  of their own net wealth position is thought to be even 
worse. To calculate saving using a wealth survey, it is necessary to 
conduct  two surveys,  the first  to establish  baseline  wealth  and  the second 
to measure  its change. Even if the responses on both surveys provide 
unbiased  and tolerably  accurate  measures of the level of wealth, even 
small errors  in the level could be large relative to the change in wealth 
used to measure  saving. 
A meaningful  measure  of saving thus requires  that the second inter- 
view occur after a sufficiently  long interval, so that the true change in 
wealth is not swamped  by reporting  errors  on the two surveys. Unfor- 
tunately, long delays between surveys can cause severe sample loss 
because  of attrition  or changes  in household  composition.  A more  subtle 
issue arises because wealth changes originate  from essentially unpre- 
dictable  capital  gains  and  losses as well as from  a consumer's  conscious 
decision to save a part of current spendable income. We sought to 
measure  household saving  from the wealth survey exclusive of capital 
gains  and  losses. To accomplish  this we estimated  the capital  gains  each 
household  would  have  enjoyed  on its initial  stock  portfolio  if the portfolio 
had risen in value at the rate of increase in the Standard  and Poor's 
index. These imputed  capital  gains  were then  subtracted  from  the change 
in the household's  wealth. Capital  gains on owner-occupied  homes can 
be obtained  directly  from the survey and were similarly  excluded from 
our measure  of saving. The appendix  contains  further  details regarding 
our  definition  of saving. 
We use two sets of wealth surveys to provide  us with information  on 
U.S.  household saving. The first of these is the Survey of Financial 
Characteristics  of Consumers,  conducted in 1963, and the companion 
Survey of Changes  in Family  Finances, conducted  a year  later  in 1964.9 
The second set of data  is drawn  from  the 1983-86  Surveys of Consumer 
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Finances.  '0 For simplicity,  we refer  to both sets of surveys as SCF. The 
1986  survey was a reinterview  of many households first interviewed  in 
the 1983  Survey of Consumer  Finances. Like the comparable  survey in 
1963, the 1983 SCF enrolled a sample that was specially drawn to 
represent  high-income  families  adequately-such families  account  for a 
disproportionate  fraction  of the nation's private  wealth. Evaluations  of 
the 1963  and 1983 data suggest that the designers of the survey were 
quite successful in obtaining  reliable  wealth  data." 
Accuracy of the Survey  Data 
Before analyzing  the saving behavior  reflected  in household survey 
data,  one must  consider  the quality  of the data  recorded  by interviewers. 
In the appendix  we show a variety of tabulations  that compare  income 
and consumption  from the CES with similar  data from other sources. 
The Census Bureau, BLS, and the Federal Reserve have performed 
additional  tabulations comparing  the CES and SCF information  and 
similar  data reported  in the national  income accounts and the Flow of 
Funds.  On  the  whole, the  wealth  data  on the SCF  appear  to have  received 
better marks for accuracy. Reports issued by the Federal Reserve 
indicate that the family asset and debt totals obtained in the SCF 
correspond  closely to aggregates  reported  in the Flow of Funds  figures, 
and we find  that the income data compare  reasonably  well with income 
reported  in other sources. 
The U.S. expenditure  surveys are more problematical.  Not only do 
these surveys record slightly less  money income than the amount 
reported  on the Census  Bureau's  Current  Population  Survey  (CPS),  they 
understate  by an even larger  amount  household  consumption  spending. 
10. See Avery  and  others  (1984). 
11. See Avery, Elliehausen,  and Kennickell  (1988)  and  the citations  they mention  for 
further  details. The 1983 survey appears  to have obtained  data that match the wealth 
tabulations  from  the Flow of Funds,  implying  that some of the difficulties  of other  wealth 
surveys result from underrepresentation  of households with extremely high wealth 
holdings.  (See  the  appendix  for  further  detail.)  A second,  more  detailed  follow-up  interview 
was conducted  in 1989,  but data  from  that interview  will not become available  until  late 
1991.  Two  other  wealth  surveys  also became  available  during  the 1980s.  The 1984  and 1989 
interviews  of  the  Panel  Survey  on Income  Dynamics  included  questions  on wealth  holdings. 
The Survey of Income and Program  Participation  also included  questions about  family 
assets. Unfortunately,  there  is no counterpart  to these surveys  for an earlier  decade  when 
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Since saving  is the difference  between income and consumption,  it will 
be overstated in the CES. If the overstatement of saving remained 
constant through time, the CES would still provide reliable data for 
studying  the change  in saving. Unfortunately,  the income data  from  the 
CES have deteriorated  somewhat faster than the consumption  data, 
leading  to a spurious  fall in the measured  saving  rate. 
We examine this underreporting  problem with some care in the 
appendix.  Our  analysis suggests that the differential  trend  in the under- 
reporting  of income and consumption  may yield a moderate  overstate- 
ment  of the decline  in  aggregate  saving.  Perhaps  one-third  of the apparent 
drop  in the saving  rate  between 1972-73  and 1983-84  is due to the trend 
in misreporting.  The remainder,  however, is due to a genuine fall in 
saving.  This  conclusion  is reinforced  by our  analysis  of the asset changes 
reported  by households  in the CES, which  also shows a decline  in saving 
between 1972-73  and 1982-85. The CES estimates of saving shown in 
the next section are based  on unadjusted  differences  between individual 
household  income and  household  consumption  spending.  Even without 
adjustments  for differential  underreporting  of income and consumption 
spending, the expenditure surveys appear to provide a useful and 
tolerably accurate source of information  for analyzing the decline in 
household  saving. 
Explaining the Decline in U.S. Saving 
Survey data obtained from individual  households are particularly 
useful for evaluating the differential saving behavior of identifiable 
subgroups  in the population  and  for exploring  the influence  of composi- 
tional changes in the population.  A number  of hypotheses have been 
advanced  that attribute  the decline in the saving  rate to reduced  saving 
on the part of specific groups, such as members of the baby-boom 
generation  or those households  that enjoyed large  capital  gains  on real- 
estate or financial assets.  Other explanations have emphasized the 
growth  in the fraction  of households  headed  by the elderly or by single 
mothers,  who traditionally  have had  low saving  rates. 
The microeconomic  survey data  have impressed  us with the extreme 
variability  in the saving rates reported  by individual  households. This 
variability  probably  reflects both the true variability  in individual  eco- Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  195 
nomic  circumstances  and  serious  reporting  errors.  The magnitude  of the 
variance  leads  us to be skeptical  that  analysis  of the data  at the individual 
household  level can yield reliable  conclusions. We do believe, however, 
that the variability  can be reduced  by focusing on average saving rates 
of specific  socioeconomic  groups.  12  The characteristics  we have used to 
group households include age, household composition, income, and 
asset ownership.  Our  study  does not, however, focus on the actual  level 
of the saving rate obtained  from the surveys; instead it emphasizes  the 
change in the saving rates of specific groups over time. We present 
comparable  data from both the Consumer  Expenditure  Survey and the 
Survey of Consumer  Finances. As explained in the previous section, 
each of these surveys has its own advantages and disadvantages  for 
measuring  saving at the level of the individual  household. The use of 
both surveys is an important  check on any conclusions  that  emerge. 
Demographic  Change 
Change in the age structure  of the population has received much 
attention  in recent years, both as an explanation  for the past decline in 
saving and as a potential source of sharply  lower future saving in the 
industrial  world. According to the standard  life-cycle view, heads of 
household accumulate  wealth by saving during  most of their working 
years and then dissaving in retirement.  To the extent that life-cycle 
motives  dominate  saving  behavior,  increases  in  the proportion  of income 
received  by very young  or retired  heads of household  should  reduce  the 
aggregate  saving rate. Along somewhat  different  lines, it has also been 
argued  that the decline in saving over the last decade can be traced  to 
the changing  behavior of specific groups in the population. Michael 
Boskin and Lawrence Lau, for example, attribute  the decline to the 
saving  behavior  of those born  after 1939.13  Other  analysts  have focused 
on the effects of demographic  change on the investment side of the 
saving and investment  balance. They have argued  that expectations of 
12. Our  analysis  of the data  suggests  that samples  with 200-300  observations  in each 
category  are required  to obtain meaningful  differences  in cell means for the Survey of 
Consumer  Finances. Cell sizes on the order  of 500-1000  are needed for the Consumer 
Expenditure  Survey.  The variance  of saving  in the CES is substantially  larger  than  in the 
SCF. 
13. Boskin  and  Lau (1988a,  1988b). 196  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
slower  future  growth  in the  labor  force  will reduce  the demand  for  capital 
and  thus the need for current  saving.  14 
MACROECONOMIC  EVIDENCE.  To date, there have been only a few 
tests of demographic  influences  on the trend in private saving. Nearly 
all have been based on an analysis  of aggregate  data. One approach  has 
been to construct an index of the influence  of demographic  effects on 
the aggregate  private saving rate. This can be accomplished using a 
simple  two-step procedure.  First  the saving  rate  of each age group  must 
be determined  for some base period. Then the fraction of aggregate 
income received by households  in each age group  is calculated  for past 
or future  periods. The index of demographic  influence  is the weighted 
sum of saving rates in each age group, with the weights equal to the 
proportion  of aggregate  income received by each group."5 
It is assumed in such an exercise that the income share of each age 
group  is known  or  can  be predicted  and  that  the  relative  saving  propensity 
within each age category remains unchanged over time. Under the 
additional  assumption  that the relative incomes of each age group re- 
main  constant  over time, a simpler  measure  of demographic  influence  is 
the dependency  ratio-the  ratio of the population  of very old and very 
young  people to the population  of working-age  adults  (say, people aged 
20-64). 
A  second approach has been to  include age composition as  an 
explanatory  variable in regressions that predict aggregate  time-series 
consumption  or saving  behavior. Studies  using this approach  implicitly 
assume  that  the age profile  of saving  and  relative  income  is constant  over 
time. For example,  in an attempt  to establish  the influence  of population 
aging on aggregate  saving, economists at the International  Monetary 
Fund (IMF) recently analyzed the consumption  behavior  of the seven 
largest economies in the Organization  for Economic Cooperation  and 
14. Cutler  and others (1990)  and Masson and Tyron (1990).  Such an argument  may 
have limited  relevance  in today's relatively  open international  economy, in which  capital 
moves easily across national  boundaries.  It also ignores  the intergenerational  issues that 
arise  from  large  changes  in the proportion  of the population  that  is retired  and  the need to 
provide  for their  consumption  out of current  production. 
15. See Aaron, Bosworth, and Burtless  (1989, pp. 137-40).  Auerbach  and Kotlikoff 
(1989)  produced  a more refined  index that incorporates  government  as well as private 
consumption.  Both  studies  conclude  that  demographic  changes  should  raise  private  saving 
in the 1990s and reduce it early in the next century. But the studies also show that 
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Development  (OECD)  over the period 1967-87.  They found  a significant 
statistical  correlation  between  private  saving  rates and  the change  in the 
proportion  of people under 15  and over 65 years of age.'6 
A similar correlation has been found by Charles Horioka in the 
aggregate  data for Japan. His results led him to forecast that the rapid 
aging  of the Japanese  population  will yield a private saving rate below 
that of the United States by the year 2005.  17The main difficulty  with 
these aggregative  approaches  is that the age structure  of the population 
changes  so slowly that  any index resembles  a simple  trend,  which could 
be easily confused with the influence of other secular changes in the 
determinants  of saving. 
The strongest  empirical  evidence for the importance  of demographic 
factors has been obtained through  a series of cross-sectional studies 
comparing  international  differences in saving rates.'8 Some of these 
studies were undertaken  as part  of the debate over the effects of social 
security on saving and included  measures  of the age distribution  of the 
population  in the regressions. For data from the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the studies generally found a significant  negative correlation 
between the proportion  of a nation's  population  that was very young or 
retired  (that is, dependent)  and that nation's saving rate. The analysts 
obtained  the plausible  result  that  the negative  influence  of the proportion 
of aged or retired people on private saving was about twice that of 
children.  As an offset to the rise in the dependency  rate, which reduces 
overall saving, the studies also found that an increased propensity to 
earlier  retirement  tends  to raise  the saving  rate  of the currently  employed. 
Bosworth recently attempted to replicate the main findings of the 
cross-sectional studies.  '9 He found that the earlier results are highly 
sensitive to the specific countries included  in the analysis. Results are 
also affected  by the data  revisions that have occurred  since the original 
studies were done. Bosworth concluded that the influence of demo- 
graphic  factors  on aggregate  saving  is smaller  and  less reliably  determined 
16. Masson and Tyron (1990). The regression  was based on pooled data from the 
individual  countries, and the statistical significance  of the demographic  variable  was 
limited  to the 1980s. 
17. Horioka  (1989b). 
18. See, for example, Modigliani  (1970), Feldstein (1980), Modigliani  and Sterling 
(1983),  and  Horioka  (1989a). 
19. Bosworth  (1990). 198  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
than the effects estimated in the earlier  analyses. Nonetheless, demo- 
graphic  factors  continued  to be correlated  with the observed  differences 
in national  saving  rates in the early 1980s. 
The  limitations  of the international  cross-sectional  findings  are  appar- 
ent when they are used to predict  the trend of aggregate  saving within 
individual  countries. According to the results obtained in the typical 
cross-sectional regression, the net effect of age composition changes 
should have been to increase private saving in most industrialized 
countries  through  the late 1970s  and  early 1980s.20  Private  saving  should 
have increased because the large decline in the proportion of  the 
population  that  was young  dominated  the increase  in the proportion  that 
was retired.  In  addition,  the  increased  propensity  toward  early  retirement 
in the industrial  countries should have increased  the planned  saving of 
the current  working population. Despite these predictions, however, 
private saving rates fell everywhere except the United Kingdom  and 
Canada.  The  low predictive  power  of the cross-sectional  studies  suggests 
that they have limited value in explaining  the impact of demographic 
factors on recent  trends  in saving. 
HOUSEHOLD  SURVEY  EVIDENCE.  Microeconomic  survey data pro- 
vide an alternative  source of information  about  the possible influence  of 
demographic  change on national  saving rates. Saving  profiles  based on 
age and estimated  using microeconomic  data  indicate  why the previous 
studies, which assume  constant  age-based  saving  profiles,  fail to explain 
the movement  in aggregate  saving. In table 3 we show saving rates by 
age of household  head compiled  using the two U.S. household surveys. 
The top half of the table displays saving rates, population  shares, and 
relative  incomes for five age groups  calculated  using  the 1963  and 1983- 
86 SCF. The same measures, computed  using the 1972-73  and 1982-85 
CES, are shown in the bottom half of the table. As noted earlier, we 
attempted  to make  the two measures  of saving  comparable  by removing 
capital gains on initial holdings from the wealth changes calculated in 
the SCF. 
Both surveys capture  the decline in the personal saving rate during 
the 1980s  that  is evident  in the national  accounts. While  the two surveys 
differ  in the reported  level of saving  rates across age groups, the size of 
the decline  in the total  saving  rate  is surprisingly  similar-4.5 percentage 
points in the SCF and  4.3 points in the CES. 
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Table 3.  Household Survey Results for Age Distribution of Saving and Income, 
United States,  1963-85 
Percent 
Age group  Survey 
Item  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  65 and over  total 
Survey  of Consumer  Finances 
Saving rate 
1963  14.7  11.3  17.2  14.2  11.2  14.0 
1983-85  13.6  10.1  10.3  10.6  2.5  9.5 
Change  -  1.1  -1.2  -6.9  -3.6  -8.7  -4.5 
Age distribution 
1963  21.5  20.7  20.8  17.0  19.9  100.0 
1983-85  20.5  18.4  18.3  15.4  27.4  100.0 
Relative  incomea 
1963  104.0  125.5  124.5  91.8  50.6  100.0 
1983-85  90.5  130.8  129.5  100.4  66.6  100.0 
Consumer  Expenditure  Survey 
Saving rate 
1972-73  9.5  12.1  16.8  22.9  14.9  15.1 
1982-85  9.6  8.6  10.5  15.8  11.5  10.8 
Change  0.1  -3.5  -6.3  -7.1  -3.4  -4.3 
Age distribution 
1972-73  22.6  18.7  20.2  17.5  21.0  100.0 
1982-85  25.8  21.1  15.5  16.0  21.6  100.0 
Relative  incomea 
1972-73  95.0  119.9  126.5  104.9  58.0  100.0 
1982-85  94.1  120.3  124.5  102.7  67.5  100.0 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  data  from  the Survey  of Consumer  Finances  and  the Consumer  Expenditure 
Survey.  We attempted  to make  the two measures  of saving  comparable  by removing  capital  gains  on initial  holdings 
from wealth changes  calculated  in the Survey of Consumer  Finances.  The saving rate shown for the Survey of 
Consumer  Finances  is savings  as a percent  of income, and the saving  rate shown for the Consumer  Expenditure 
Survey  is saving  as a percent  of disposable  income. 
a. The average  income  of each group  relative  to average  income  for the entire  survey  is shown  for the Survey  of 
Consumer  Finances.  The relative  disposable  income  for each group  is shown  for the Consumer  Expenditure  Survey. 
The most interesting  aspect of the survey  data  is the decline  in saving 
for almost all age groups. There is no evidence that the decline is 
concentrated  among  households  headed  by members  of the baby-boom 
generation, as suggested by Boskin and Lau.21  In fact, both surveys 
indicate that the relative decline in saving has been smaller among 
younger  households.  In  the SCF, saving  rates  fell only  about  1  percentage 
point  for the two groups  aged 25 to 44 between 1963  and 1983-85.  In the 
CES, the saving  rate  of households  headed  by someone under  the age of 
45 fell an average of just 1.7 percentage  points between 1972-73 and 
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1982-85.  By contrast,  the saving  rate  of households  headed  by someone 
over 45 fell 7 percentage  points in the SCF and 6 percentage  points in 
the CES. For both surveys, then, the drop in saving among younger 
households  was significantly  smaller  than  among  older  households. 
The  saving  rates  shown  in  table  3 are  reported  without  standard  errors. 
We believe that the standard  errors  may provide a misleading  measure 
of the statistical significance  of differences in saving rates over time, 
because of the reporting  errors  discussed earlier.  Reporting  errors  can 
bias the measured  change in saving rates, thus making  the estimate of 
standard  error unreliable. In addition, it is not possible to compute 
standard errors directly because the saving rate in each subgroup 
represents  the ratio  of total saving  to total income in the group;  it is not 
the  average  of the  individual  saving  rates  in  the  group.  We  have, however, 
estimated  standard  errors  using  the bootstrap  method.22  (The  bootstrap 
estimates of the standard  errors are reported in the appendix.) The 
standard  error  of the difference  in saving rates in the SCF is about 1.5 
percentage  points for the overall sample. In the much larger  CES the 
standard  error  of the overall  difference  is  just 0.7 percentage  points. For 
smaller subgroups  in each survey the standard  errors can be several 
times larger.  Thus, saving  rate changes of less than  2 percentage  points 
probably  have little statistical  significance. 
The trend in real interest rates over the period provides a possible 
explanation  for the age pattern  of the saving  decline. The real corporate 
bond rate averaged  2.6 percent in 1963  and 3.3 percent in the 1972-73 
period  but  thenjumped  to 7.5 percent  between 1982  and  1985.23  Although 
the usual  expectation  is that  a rise in the real  rate  of return  will generate 
additional  personal  saving,  economic theory  is in fact ambiguous  on this 
point. Among older households a jump in the rate of return  on existing 
wealth holdings may actually reduce saving out of current income, 
because older  consumers  find  that  their  existing  wealth  permits  a higher- 
than-anticipated  flow  of consumption  in retirement.  Younger  consumers 
have less wealth holdings, however. Their saving is more affected by 
22. For a clear introduction  to the technique,  see Efron  and  Tibshirani  (1986).  In our 
application  of the method, we drew 50 random samples from each subgroup, with 
replacement,  and  calculated  the standard  error  of the resulting  distribution  of 50 estimates 
of the subgroup  saving  rate. 
23. Our  measure  of the real corporate  bond rate is the difference  between Moody's 
estimate of the BAA corporate  bond yield and consumers'  expectations  of the annual 
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the  fact  that  thejump  in  the real  rate  of return  makes  current  consumption 
more costly relative  to future  consumption.  Hence, their rate of saving 
could rise, or at least decline  by less than  the saving  of older  consumers. 
Except for the 1983-86  SCF, the results show a "humped"  pattern  to 
the age distribution  of saving  rates.24  But, as noted in other studies, the 
saving  rate of elderly  households  remains  positive. As a result, there is 
not a large  enough  difference  in saving  rates  by age for the graying  of the 
U.S. population  to have had an appreciable  effect on the overall saving 
rate. 
The aggregate  saving  rate  in each survey is expressed as 
G 
(1l)  St  =  Wit Yit  Sit, 
where 
St  =  aggregate saving rate in period t; 
wit  =  proportion  of household  heads in the ith age group; 
yit =  ratio  of average  income in the ith group  to the overall average; 
sit =  saving  rate of the ith age group;  and 
G  =  number of age groups. 
Given information  on w, y, and s, from  two surveys widely spaced over 
time, changes  in the overall  saving  rate  can be decomposed  into changes 
in saving rates within  age categories, changes in the age distribution  of 
those households, and changes  in relative  incomes. 
The trivial  significance  of demographic  factors on saving trends  can 
be demonstrated  using equation 1. The table below shows the effect of 
these factors on three saving  rates (in percent).  The first  column  shows 
the population  saving  rate  actually  recorded  on the surveys. The second 
column shows the saving rates that would have been recorded in the 
later  surveys  if the age distribution  of different  age groups  had  remained 
fixed  at the distribution  observed  by the first  survey (that  is, if wit  = wil). 
Only the saving  rates within  each age group  and the relative  incomes of 
the different age groups are allowed to vary over time. In the third 
column, the age distribution  and the relative incomes of different  age 
groups  are held fixed at the levels observed by the first survey (that is, 
24. The saving  rate of the elderly  would be reduced  further  if pension benefits  were 
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wit -  wil and yit  =  yil)  Only the  saving rates within  age groups are 
allowed  to vary. 
With  age and 
relative 
With  age  income  held 
Survey  Saving  rate  held constant  constant 
SCF 
1963  14.0  14.0  14.0 
1983-85  9.5  10.3  10.2 
CES 
1972-73  15.1  15.1  15.1 
1982-85  10.8  11.1  11.0 
The results in the table demonstrate convincingly that aggregate 
saving fell because saving dropped  off within age groups. Of the total 
drop  in saving  in the SCF, 84 percent  (or 3.8 percentage  points)  is due to 
the fall in within-group  saving rates. For the CES, 95 percent (or 4.1 
percentage points) is attributable  to the drop in within-group  saving 
rates. Changes  in the age distribution  of households  and in the relative 
incomes of households in different age categories contributed only 
slightly  to the decline. 
ALTERNATIVE  TREATMENT  OF  PENSIONS.  The previous analysis 
does understate the contribution  of demographic  change because it 
excludes saving  within  employer  pension plans. On a national  accounts 
basis, part of the decline in personal saving during the  1980s was 
attributable  to reduced saving within  these pension plans. The surveys 
provide data on pension benefit payments, but we lack reliable infor- 
mation  on employer contributions  and the capital  income of the plans. 
Private employer contributions to pension plans represent about 4 
percent of the money wages paid to private wage and salary workers. 
Interest  earnings  of the funds  have risen  over time  and  by the early 1980s 
exceeded employer  contributions  to the plans. If pension contributions 
and interest earnings  were included  in workers' incomes, the effect on 
household  saving  would be nontrivial. 
We can roughly  assess the significance  of pension contributions  for 
our saving estimates by imputing  pension contributions  and interest 
earnings for wage earners in the survey. These estimates of pension 
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to obtain an alternative  measure  of workers' incomes.25  To reflect the 
NIA treatment  of pension  payments  in our  calculations,  we also modified 
our definition of household income to exclude the pension benefits 
(though  not the social security  benefits)  reported  on the surveys. This is 
clearly an extreme assumption  for two reasons. First, pensioners such 
as federal  annuitants  and retired  servicemen  receive pension payments 
that amount  to transfers  rather  than dissaving  from a pension reserve. 
And second, many  pensioners'  incomes should  be adjusted  to include  at 
least part  of the interest  income earned  on pension  reserves. Instead, in 
our modified  definition  all of the interest income is credited to current 
workers. 
The table below shows the effect of  these modifications in the 
treatment  of pension contributions  and  pension  benefits  on saving  rates 
(in  percent). 
Income  Saving rate by age group (CES) 
definition  25-44  45-64  Over 64  Total 
Original 
1972-73  10.8  19.4  14.9  15.1 
1982-85  9.1  13.0  11.5  10.8 
Change  -  1.7  - 6.4  - 3.4  - 4.3 
Modified 
1972-73  15.5  21.9  1.8  16.9 
1982-85  17.2  15.2  -  3.9  14.0 
Change  1.7  - 6.5  - 5.7  - 2.9 
The modifications  raise the measured  income and saving rates of wage 
and  salary  workers  and  reduce  the income  and  saving  rates  of pensioners. 
This is reflected  in the table in the higher  saving rates of the young and 
dramatically  reduced saving rates of  the elderly. Even with these 
modifications, aggregate private saving fell between the two survey 
25. The  sum  of employer  contributions  and  interest  earnings  in  pension  plans  amounted 
to 5.3 percent  of private  wage and salary  earnings  in 1972-73  and 8.9 percent  of private 
money  wages in 1982-84.  In our imputation  of pension  compensation  to wage and salary 
workers,  we assumed  that  these percentages  could be applied  to earnings  reported  by all 
employees, including  both private  and public  employees. In fact, contributions  for state 
and  local  employees  are  likely  to exceed this  percentage,  since  government  employees  are 
covered by more  generous  pensions than  private  employees. On the other hand,  contri- 
butions  for federal  workers  should  probably  be excluded from private  saving since it is 
doubtful  that  such  contributions  result  in a genuine  pension  reserve. 204  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
dates, with the decline concentrated  among  those aged 45 or older. The 
modified  definition  of saving actually shows a small increase in saving 
among  younger  households, although  this is probably  an artifact  of our 
imputation  procedure.26 
Because saving rates differ so widely by age, it is possible that the 
modified  definition  of saving  implies  a larger  response  of aggregate  saving 
to shifts in the age structure  of the population.  It turns out, however, 
that virtually  all of the drop  in the modified  measure  of saving  between 
the two survey  periods-2.8  percentage  points  out of the 2.9 percentage- 
point  drop-is  still  due  to the  drop  in saving  within  age  groups.  Moreover, 
when we forecast the future course of the aggregate  saving rate using 
population  projections  from  the Social Security  Administration,  we find 
only a small impact of demographic  shifts. Using age-specific saving 
rates  obtained  under  the modified  definition,  the aggregate  saving  rate is 
projected  to rise slightly  over the remainder  of the century  and  then fall 
about 1 percentage  point between 2000  and  2020. 
In sum, even under  a definition  of household  saving  that exaggerates 
the extent of private  saving  among  young  householders  and  understates 
saving among the elderly, we find that changes in the age structure  of 
the population  have had and will continue  to have only a modest effect 
on the overall  saving  rate. Virtually  all of the recent  fluctuation  in saving 
has occurred because middle-aged  and older consumers have sharply 
reduced their saving. The household survey data thus provide little 
support  for the claim that the saving rate will climb sharply  in the near 
future  as the baby-boom  generation  moves into age groups  with histori- 
cally high saving rates, nor is there good evidence that saving will 
inevitably  decline in the future  as the relative size of the retired  popula- 
tion climbs. 
HOUSEHOLD  COMPOSITION.  Saving  rates may differ  across families 
not only because of the age of the family head, but also because of 
differences in household composition. Heads of U.S.  families have 
experienced  major  changes  in marital  status  and child-rearing  responsi- 
bilities  over the last two decades. The cost of providing  for a spouse and 
26. The cost of funding  pensions  is much lower for younger  than  for older  workers. 
Younger  workers  are less likely to be covered by a plan, and, if covered by a defined- 
benefit  plan,  the required  employer  contributions  are likely  to be smaller.  Our  imputation 
procedure  nonetheless assumes that the contribution  rate is identical  for all wage and 
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Table  4. Saving  and Income,  by Family  Type, United  States, 1963-85a 
Percent 
Married  Single 
With  Without  With  Without  Survey 
Item  children  children  children  children  total 
Survey  of Consumer  Finances 
Saving  rate 
1963  14.5  15.9  -0.4  15.5  14.4 
1983-85  9.4  15.4  1.2  11.9  11.0 
Change  -5.1  -0.5  1.6  - 3.6  - 3.4 
Population  distribution 
1963  54.2  21.0  6.9  17.9  100.0 
1983-85  40.1  23.2  10.5  26.2  100.0 
Relative  income 
1963  113.1  115.3  56.5  59.1  100.0 
1983-85  115.8  124.6  62.8  68.8  100.0 
Consumer  Expenditure  Survey 
Saving  rate 
1972-73  14.1  22.3  -14.3  12.0  15.1 
1982-85  7.5  18.2  -  11.1  14.2  10.7 
Change  -6.6  -4.1  3.2  2.2  -4.4 
Population  distribution 
1972-73  48.6  25.3  7.3  18.9  100.0 
1982-85  39.5  24.4  10.2  26.0  100.0 
Relative  income 
1972-73  116.6  112.5  53.4  58.6  100.0 
1982-85  118.5  117.6  58.8  71.4  100.0 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  data  from  the Survey  of Consumer  Finances  and the Consumer  Expenditure 
Survey.  See the text and notes to table 3 for further  detail. 
a. The table shows the saving  behavior  of households  in which  the head of the household  is aged 25 to 64. The 
survey  total  does not correspond  to totals  in other  tables  because  of the different  sample  size. 
children  may have a sizable effect on saving  decisions. Married  couples 
may behave differently  than single people because of the income insur- 
ance  provided  by a second  potential  earner,  and  the increased  prevalence 
of single-headed  households  with children  may  have reduced  the overall 
saving  rate. 
Table 4 displays information  about the saving of different  types of 
households. The saving rates reported in the table show that saving 
varies  widely  by marital  status  and  the presence  or absence  of dependent 
children.  The decomposition  of saving  shown  in the table  fails to provide 
a simple explanation  for the drop in aggregate  saving, however. Both 
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have the lowest saving rates in the population.  Moreover, a significant 
shift  toward  this type of family structure  has occurred  since the 1960s.27 
But the incomes of single-parent  families are simply too low for their 
increased prevalence to have had a noticeable effect on the overall 
saving  rate. Virtually  all of the decline in average  household saving  has 
occurred  because of a plunge in the saving within  the different  family 
groups  defined  in table 4. Little of it occurred  as a result of shifts in the 
relative income distribution  or in the distribution  of households  across 
different  family  types. If we calculate  the weighted  sum of group  saving 
rates for the 1980s  using  the population  weights and relative  incomes of 
the earlier survey period, the projected  total saving rate is almost the 
same as the actual saving rate observed in the  1980s. In fact, the 
hypothetical  rate,  assuming  wit  =  wil  and  yit  =  yil,  is  within  0.2 
percentage  points of the observed rate  for both the CES and SCF. All of 
the remaining  decline in aggregate  saving is due to the drop in saving 
within  family  groups. 
As a further  check on these results, we tabulated  the saving  rates of 
households headed by married  couples aged 24-65 and differentiated 
between families  according  to household  size and  the number  of earners 
present. Those tabulations,  not reported  here, show the same general 
pattern  evident in tables 3 and 4. Both the wealth and the expenditure 
surveys reveal, not surprisingly,  that the family saving rate shrinks  as 
household  size rises but  increases  with the number  of earners.  From  our 
perspective, however, the interesting  result is that saving rates decline 
over time in all groups, regardless  of family size or number  of earners. 
In addition, despite large changes in the composition of families, with 
respect to both household  size and number  of earners, shifts in compo- 
sition actually should have boosted the aggregate  saving rate by 0.2 to 
1.5 percentage  points. Thus, the decline in total saving  occurred  despite 
shifts in family  structure  that should  have raised  it. 
Income Distribution 
Basic life-cycle consumption  theory  suggests  that  saving  rates should 
not be closely linked to permanent  income. Indeed, the rate of saving 
27. The differences  in saving  rates  between  the two surveys'  groups  of single  heads  of 
household  with children  illustrate  that  the SCF was much  better  at obtaining  information 
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Table  5. Saving  and Income,  by Income  Quintile,  United  States, 1963-85 
Percent 
Income quintile  Survey 
Item  First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  total 
Survey  of Consumer  Finances 
Saving  rate 
1963  -0.3  7.9  15.4  13.5  16.5  14.0 
1983-85  -2.4  -2.9  10.0  9.9  12.5  9.5 
Change  -2.1  -  10.8  - 5.4  - 3.6  -4.0  -4.5 
Relative  income 
1963  19.4  50.7  85.5  123.9  220.4  100.0 
1983-85  20.6  46.2  77.7  119.8  232.7  100.0 
Consumer  Expenditure  Survey 
Saving  rate 
1972-73  -45.4  -  1.5  9.0  17.5  28.6  15.1 
1982-85  -92.1  -  10.3  8.7  16.7  25.8  10.8 
Change  -46.7  -8.8  -0.3  -0.8  -2.8  -4.3 
Relative  income 
1972-73  24.8  58.1  89.9  124.6  206.8  100.0 
1982-85  24.2  55.9  86.8  124.3  208.9  100.0 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  data  from  the Survey  of Consumer  Finances  and the Consumer  Expenditure 
Survey.  See the text and notes to table  3 for further  detail. 
should  be independent  of the level of lifetime  income. (Noted exceptions 
to the basic model  are that  consumers  may be constrained  in liquidity  or 
subject to a volatile income stream, which gives rise to the positive 
correlation  between saving  rates and income levels observed in micro- 
economic data.) More specifically, theory suggests that estimates of 
saving rates arranged  by income class should be highly misleading. 
Transitory  movements in income will lead to a pronounced  overstate- 
ment  of normal  saving  by households  reported  to be in the upper  part  of 
the income  distribution  in a given year and  an understatement  of normal 
saving  by those near  the bottom. However, if we assume that  transitory 
income  movements  are  of roughly  equal  relative  importance  in all years, 
it may still be useful to examine the changes in saving over time at 
different  points in the income distribution. 
Saving rates arranged  by quintiles of the income distribution  are 
reported  in table 5. Again, the most striking  feature of the table is the 
uniformity  of the decline in saving across groups. The SCF shows a 
marked  decline  in the saving  rates  of every income  group  over the period 
1963-85. And, except for the middle  quintile, the saving rate also falls 
substantially  in the CES. 208  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Relative income shares by income class are similar  in the SCF and 
CES, but the SCF reports a larger proportion  of total income in the 
highest  quintile,  presumably  because  a special  effort  was made  to survey 
the very wealthiest  households, which may be underrepresented  in the 
CES. Saving rates in the CES, however, are more variable  by income 
class. The very low average  saving  rates  in the poorest CES households 
can  be attributed  to the survey's  failure  to measure  transfers  and  alimony 
accurately. These income sources are more common among poorer 
households. This problem  is exacerbated  by the fact that the consump- 
tion of poor families  is probably  more accurately  measured  than  that of 
wealthier  households.  The underestimate  of income  is less important  for 
the SCF since it has no impact  on the measurement  of saving and thus 
produces only a minor  overstatement  of the saving rate. Both surveys 
show little change  in the relative  income distribution  over time, with the 
notable  exception that the relative  income of the richest quintile  in the 
SCF rose. On balance, shifts in the distribution  of income should  have 
slightly  increased  saving  in the 1980s  compared  to earlier  decades. 
Capital Gains 
Some analysts, citing the extraordinary  rise in equity values since 
1982,  believe that  increases  in the wealth-income  ratio  provide  a simple 
explanation  for the decline in saving rates. Such an argument  is partic- 
ularly relevant given the prominent  role of the wealth-income  ratio in 
the life-cycle model of consumer behavior. Adherents of this view, 
however, appear  to forget the collapse of equity prices in the 1973-74 
period and in 1982. In fact, since the early 1970s households have 
experienced little or no real gain on equities and may even have 
experienced real losses depending  on the precise starting  and ending 
dates used for measurement.28  Total household wealth fell about 10 
percent  in real terms as a result of the 1973-74  stock market  decline. A 
partial  recovery of the market  and significant  real gains on home real 
estate in the late 1970s  restored some of those losses. But there were 
again large losses on equities in the early 1980s, and real-estate  price 
increases in that period  failed to keep up with general  inflation.  House- 
holds experienced  substantial  capital  gains  in equities  and  housing  in the 
28. Bosworth  and  Burtless  (1990). Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  209 
mid-1980s,  but these occurred  after  a large  part  of the decline in saving 
rates. 
We examine the effects of capital  gains by contrasting  the behavior 
of households with and without large asset holdings. In particular,  we 
compare  families owning stocks and bonds with families that own no 
corporate  equity or debt. We also compare  saving among  homeowners 
with that  among  nonhomeowners. 
The SCF and  CES report  nearly  identical  estimates  of the percentage 
of households owning bonds or owning equities (29 percent versus 26 
percent),  even though  the identification  of wealth  holding  is only a minor 
objective  of the CES. Average  saving  rates  of owners  and  nonowners  of 
marketable  financial  assets are shown in table 6. The measurement  of 
saving  for owners of marketable  financial  assets in the SCF is at best a 
crude approximation  because a capital  gain on corporate  equities pro- 
duces a change  in net worth  that can only be removed  by assuming  that 
the value  of each household's  portfolio  changed  in line  with  the Standard 
and  Poor's index. While  this assumption  is obviously absurd  at the level 
of individual  respondents,  it is a useful approximation  for equity  holders 
as a whole. In any case, the interesting  result is that the decline in the 
saving  rate  in the SCF is actually  smaller  among  stock- and  bondholders 
than it is among households with no marketable  financial  assets. The 
CES shows a decline in saving for households both with and without 
financial  assets, and, while the absolute decline is larger  for owners of 
financial  assets, the relative  declines  in two groups'  saving  rates  are  very 
similar. 
In order  to investigate  the influence  of capital  gains from homeown- 
ership,  the SCF  and  CES  samples  are  split  into  homeowner  and  nonhome- 
owner  groups,  and  we included  some disaggregation  by age even though 
the size of the individual  cells in the SCF is small.29  The results are 
shown  in table  6 and  are  at least consistent  with  the argument  that  capital 
gains on housing may have contributed  to lower saving rates. Saving 
rates of homeowners  fell substantially  in both surveys-a  decline of 6.4 
percentage  points  in the SCF  and  5.5 percentage  points  in the CES. Also, 
the decline  for homeowners  is pronounced  in the middle  age group  (aged 
45-65), which is consistent with a finding  by Joyce Manchester  and 
29. The effect of housing  capital  gains  has been the subject  of some previous  analysis 
based on survey data. See, for example, Manchester  and Poterba  (1989)  and Skinner 
(1989). 00  \- 
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James Poterba that the incidence of second-mortgage  borrowing is 
concentrated  in that  group.30  Saving  rates of nonhomeowners  fell less in 
both surveys-  1.9 percentage  points in the CES and  just 0.5 points in 
the SCF. The survey data  thus provide  some evidence that the boom in 
real-estate  prices may have been a contributing  factor to lower saving, 
but we find no evidence to support  the claim that the jump in equity 
prices reduced  household  saving. 
International  Evidence on the Decline in Saving 
The U.S.  data strongly imply that efforts to explain the decline in 
household saving must emphasize general factors that affect a large 
proportion  of all households. Explanations  that rely on reduced  saving 
by one demographic  or economic group appear  to be contradicted  by 
the data. As mentioned  earlier, however, the amount  of survey infor- 
mation  on U.S. household  saving  is very restricted.  In addition,  we have 
no assurance that the change in saving rates obtained from surveys, 
taken at two points in time, reflects the same phenomenon  reported  in 
the national  accounts. Thus, we have supplemented  the results for the 
United States with an analysis  of similar  surveys for Canada  and  Japan. 
Canada 
Recent Canadian  saving  has fluctuated  over a much  wider  range  than 
has saving in the United States. Personal saving, as reported in the 
Canadian  national  accounts, rose from  slightly  over 5 percent  of dispos- 
able income in the late 1960s to 15 percent in the early 1980s, before 
falling  back to 10  percent  in 1989.31  It is possible to identify  some of the 
sources of the movement in saving rates by distinguishing  between 
saving in formal retirement  accounts and in other categories. While 
pensions and other forms of retirement saving are somewhat more 
30. Manchester  and  Poterba  (1989). 
31. The large  spike  in 1982  is an anomaly  that  can be traced  to a very large  decline  in 
household  borrowing  that was itself a response to very high nominal  interest  rates. The 
responsiveness  of household  borrowing  to interest rates is generally  much stronger  in 
Canada  than  in the United  States,  primarily  for  institutional  reasons.  See Bosworth  (1989). 
Unlike  the United  States, mortgage  interest  payments  are  not deductible  for tax purposes 
in Canada,  and  most  mortgages  are  of short  maturity-commonly  no more  than  five years. 212  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Figure 2.  Components  of Personal Saving, Canada, 196589 
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Source: Canadian  national  accounts. 
important  in Canada  than in the United States, the data displayed in 
figure  2 clearly indicate  that the volatility  of Canadian  saving has been 
concentrated  in nonretirement  saving accounts. Movements in these 
types of accounts should be captured  in survey responses concerning 
household  saving  and  consumption  behavior.  The  Registered  Retirement 
Saving Plans (RRSPs), which expanded significantly  in the 1970s, are 
similar  to Individual  Retirement  Accounts (IRAs)  in the United States, 
but they are a minor source of the variability  in Canadian  saving and 
only a secondary  source of the secular  increase  in the overall  rate. 
Canada undertakes a periodic survey of  household income and 
consumption  expenditures,  called Family Expenditure  in Canada,  that 
is similar  to the U.S. Consumer  Expenditure  Survey.32  The Canadian 
survey makes a greater effort to  obtain a full income-expenditure 
statement for each household sampled, and the quality of the data 
consequently  seems generally  superior  to that  for the United States. As 
in the United States, more information  is obtained  about expenditures 
than  income  because  the survey  serves as the main  source  of information 
32. Household  Surveys  Division  (1986). Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  213 
Table 7.  Age Distribution of Saving and Income, Canada,  1969-86 
Percent 
Alternative  saving 
Age  group  measuresa 
National  Survey  Under  Over 
Item  accounts  total  45  45-64  64  Alt I  Alt 2 
Saving  rateb 
1969  5.0  6.0  4.1  8.6  6.3  6.0  6.0 
1978  12.6  12.1  8.8  16.6  14.5  12.3  12.3 
1982  18.2  15.5  12.3  19.2  20.4  15.7  15.0 
1986  10.7  10.1  7.2  14.3  11.0  10.2  10.5 
Population  share 
1969  ...  100.0  48.2  33.7  18.1  ...  ... 
1978  ...  100.0  51.1  31.8  17.1  ...  ... 
1982  ...  100.0  52.9  30.0  17.2  ...  ... 
1986  ...  100.0  51.7  30.0  18.3 
Relative  incomec 
1969  ...  100.0  110.0  110.2  54.4  ...  ... 
1978  ...  100.0  107.3  112.0  55.9  ...  ... 
1982  ...  100.0  106.4  112.4  58.2 
1986  ...  100.0  104.4  117.3  59.3  ... 
Source: Household  Surveys  Division  (1986)  and Canadian  national  accounts.  The tabulations  include  all families 
and unrelated  individuals. 
a. Alt 1 shows the saving  rate computed  with 1969  demographic  and relative  income shares.  Alt 2 is computed 
with 1969  demographic  shares. 
b. Saving equals after-tax  income plus other money receipts minus consumption  expenditures  and gifts and 
contributions  paid. It is shown  in the table as a percent  of after-tax  income. 
c. Relative  income  is the average  after-tax  income  in each  age group  relative  to the average  over  the whole  sample. 
for constructing  the weights in the consumer  price index. Our  analysis 
is based on surveys for four  different  years between 1969  and 1986.  The 
surveys  represent  both  urban  and  rural  households  and  use samples  that 
range  in size from  8,000 in 1982  to 15,000  in 1969.  We have been forced 
to reduce  the number  of age categories  when calculating  the influence  of 
demographic  changes  because  detailed  age data  for 1969  are  unavailable, 
but this limitation  has very little impact  on our  results.33 
Table 7 presents estimates from both national  accounts and survey 
data on the Canadian  saving rate. The concepts of income and saving 
reflected in the Canadian survey differ from those in the Canadian 
national  accounts for many of the same reasons discussed earlier  with 
regard  to U.S. surveys. Nonetheless, as the table shows, the average 
saving  rate  for  all  households  in the survey  changes  over time  in a  pattern 
that closely parallels  the movements  in the saving  rate measured  in the 
national accounts. Both rates show a sharp increase in saving in the 
1970s, followed by a decline in the 1980s. As in the U.S.  Consumer 
33. Households  headed  by someone  under  the age of 25 do have low saving  rates,  but 
their  weight  in the total  is small. 214  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1  :1991 
Expenditure Survey, the pattern of saving by age shows a humped 
distribution.  Also in common with the U.S.  pattern, the saving rate 
remains  strongly  positive for households headed by someone over age 
65. The  income  of elderly  households  is well below  the Canadian  average, 
but so too is their  consumption.  In  part,  the lower consumption  spending 
by the elderly can be traced to below-average  rates of expenditure  on 
consumer durables and housing. These households are presumably 
consuming  out of a previously  accumulated  stock. But the evidence for 
a sharp  decline  in consumption  after  retirement  remains  even if durables 
and  housing  are excluded. 
Tabulations  of the Canadian  saving  data  strongly  confirm  our  findings 
from survey data in the United States. The time-series  variation  in the 
overall Canadian  saving rate occurs because of very similar  changes in 
the saving rates of households in all age groups. The change in the age 
and income distribution  of the Canadian  population  has played a very 
minor  role in accounting  for the change in aggregate  saving over time. 
In  addition,  there  is no evidence  that  younger  households  are  responsible 
for a disproportionate  share of the decline in saving in the 1980s. If 
anything,  the decline in saving  among  younger  households  has been less 
than  that  among  older  households. 
Canadian  saving  rates  do vary significantly  by age. But table  7 shows 
that the Canadian  age distribution  has changed  little since 1969.  On the 
other hand, the distribution  of income has moved in favor of older 
households.  Overall,  demographic  factors  account  for  little  of the  change 
in the aggregate  saving rate. As we did for the United States, we can 
compute  a precise measure  of the influence  of demographic  and  income 
changes  using  equation  1. Two alternative  measures  of the overall  saving 
rate, using the fixed age and fixed relative  income distributions  of 1969, 
are also shown in table 7. A comparison  of these measures with the 
actual rate of  saving, shown in the  "total" column, confirms the 
insignificance  of these factors as an explanation for the variation in 
saving.34 
The tabulation  of Canadian  saving rates by income quintiles, shown 
in table 8, indicates a pattern of saving similar  to that in the United 
34. We do not present an analysis of Canadian  saving rates for different  types of 
families, but the results are similar  to those for the United States. Single-head  families 
with children  have low saving  rates, but their  average  income is too low for this group's 
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Table  8. Saving  and Income,  by Income  Quintile,  Canada,  1969-86 
Percent 
Income  quintile 
Item  Total  First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth 
Saving  rate 
1969  6.0  -19.8  -4.6  0.8  5.9  16.3 
1978  12.1  -  7.3  -0.1  7.0  12.7  22.0 
1982  15.5  -4.4  3.6  10.9  15.5  25.4 
1986  10.1  -  8.5  -  2.8  3.3  10.1  20.6 
Relative  income 
1969  100.0  32.0  65.3  93.2  121.6  187.9 
1978  100.0  34.5  65.7  93.6  122.0  183.9 
1982  100.0  33.8  63.8  91.2  122.2  189.0 
1986  100.0  33.6  61.6  88.6  122.7  193.5 
Source:  See  table 7. 
States. Again, saving  rates  are negative  in the first  two quintiles  and  rise 
with income. Most striking,  the saving rates in the individual  quintiles 
move up and down from  one survey to the next in line with the changes 
in the overall saving rate. As shown in the bottom part of table 8, the 
distribution  of family  income in Canada  is substantially  more  equal  than 
in the United States-the  ratio  of average  income in the highest  quintile 
to that  in the bottom  quintile  is about  6:1, compared  with approximately 
10:1  in the U.S. data. Nevertheless, there has been a secular  rise in the 
proportion  of income received by the top quintile, though  that change 
was sufficient  to account  for only 0.2 percentage  points  of the rise in the 
saving  rate  between 1969  and 1986. 
Finally, we tabulated  the saving  rates of homeowners  and renters  in 
Canada  because of the suggestion  in the U.S. data  that  homeowners  may 
have accounted  for a disproportionate  share of the drop in saving. We 
might expect this phenomenon  to be even more important  in Canada 
because  the credit  restraints  of the early 1980s  should  have fallen  heavily 
on Canadian  homeowners  with short mortgage  maturities.  The saving 
rates (in percent)  for homeowners  and  renters  are  given below. 
Homeowners  Renters 
1969  7.7  3.4 
1978  14.5  6.9 
1982  18.5  8.7 
1986  13.2  3.8 216  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, l.1991 
While  homeowners  do have substantially  higher  rates of saving  than 
tenants, the two saving rates change by roughly equal proportions 
between the individual  survey years.35  In addition, the decline in the 
saving rate after 1982 is more pronounced for tenants than it is for 
homeowners.  The results  for Canada  do not support  the conclusion  from 
the U.S.  data that changes in saving rates are concentrated among 
homeowners, even though the two countries enjoy similar rates of 
homeownership. 
Japan 
Japan  conducts two annual surveys that report information  on the 
saving patterns of  individual households. The Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey (FIES), conducted on a monthly basis, obtains 
diary  information  from  individual  households  on a highly  detailed  set of 
family expenditures.36  Given the difficulties of accurately measuring 
business income, however, the portion  of the sample  that  provides  data 
on income is limited to those households headed by a worker and ex- 
cludes the self-employed,  farmers,  retirees, and single-member  house- 
holds. In addition,  because of the heavy burden  of reporting,  a sample 
family  is surveyed  for only six months, with regular  monthly  rotation. 
A second supplementary  survey, the Family Saving Survey (FSS) 
taken at the end of each year, gathers information  on the flows and 
stocks of household savings and liabilities  as well as on investments  in 
fixed assets. The FSS asks for detailed information  on the stocks of 
current  assets as well as net purchases  during  the year.37  The FSS is thus 
most similar  to the Survey of Consumer  Finances in the United States. 
Furthermore,  the FSS reports  annual  income and  wealth  holdings  of the 
self-employed  and  retirees,  as well as separate  tabulations  for  households 
headed by wage and salary earners. This second survey therefore 
provides information  on the saving of nonworker  households, which is 
critical  to investigating  the role of retirees. Its primary  disadvantage  is 
that income information  is limited to total household income before 
taxes. The FSS is available  on a relatively  consistent  basis for each year 
35. The timing  of change  in home prices was different  in Canada  than  in the United 
States. In Canada,  home  prices  rose more  sharply  in the 1969-78  period  and  declined  from 
1978  to 1986.  See Engelhardt  and  Poterba  (1990). 
36. Management  and  Coordination  Agency  (1988). 
37. Management  and  Coordination  Agency  (various  years). Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  217 
after 1967 and includes separate tabulations for ten age groups and 
income quintiles. 
We have relied  primarily  on data from the FSS. Saving  is computed 
as the net change in financial  assets minus the net change in financial 
liabilities  plus the net purchases  of physical assets, including  housing. 
The survey  measure  of saving  in corporate  equities  excludes unrealized 
capital gains and losses.38  We estimate family disposable income by 
computing  the effective tax rate in each age category reported  in the 
FIES. This rate is then applied  to reported  income from the FSS. This 
methodology  seems reasonable  in that  the estimate  of before-tax  income 
of worker  households in the saving survey is a relatively  constant  frac- 
tion of the income reported  in the FIES. The mean  ratio  for the 1970-89 
period was 1.068, with a 0.016 standard  deviation. While it is hard to 
defend our assumption that the tax rate is the same for worker and 
nonworker  households, the measure  of disposable  income has no effect 
on the measure  of saving and is used only to form the denominator  of 
the saving rate. An error  in measuring  taxes is thus unlikely to distort 
the time-series  pattern  of saving  rates.39 
Figure  3 compares  the survey measure  of the household saving rate 
derived  from  the FSS to the  rate  shown  in  the  Japanese  national  accounts. 
These two measures of the saving rate show a similar  secular trend, 
rising  up through  the mid-1970s  and then falling. However, the survey 
measure  declines more sharply  in the early 1980s  and  rises near  the end 
of the period, while the national  accounts measure  declines throughout 
the decade. 
The survey concept of the Japanese saving rate differs from the 
national  accounts  concept for many  of the same  reasons  as in the United 
States. Published  data  are not available  to investigate  the importance  of 
the conceptual  differences,  but  the  Japanese  Economic  Planning  Agency 
reports that adjustments  to the national accounts, using unpublished 
data, can account  for the differences  in the level of the two saving  rates 
and  would  moderate  the extent of decline  in the NIA measure.  The sharp 
decline and subsequent recovery of the survey measure in the early 
1980s  remains  unexplained,  however. 
The Japanese  data  are valuable  because they let us examine  changes 
38. Changes  in corporate  equities  are measured  as stock purchases  during  the survey 
year  minus  stock sales during  the same  year. 
39. The assumption  of similar  tax rates  is particularly  inappropriate  for the older  age 
group  because  retirees  receive significant  untaxed  transfer  income. 218  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Figure 3.  Alternative  Measures of Household  Saving, Japan, 1968-89 
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Source:  Japan's Family Saving Survey and Japanese  national accounts. 
in age-specific  saving  rates  annually  over a twenty-year  period. Because 
the FSS provides information  on the number  and relative income of 
households  in each age bracket,  we can compute  a direct  measure  of the 
influence  of demographic  change  on the overall saving  rate. 
Household  saving  rates  grouped  by the age of the household  head  are 
shown in table 9 for three periods:  the early 1970s,  the early 1980s,  and 
the late 1980s.  The data  do show a slightly  humped  distribution  of saving 
by age, but the extent of the difference  among  age groups  is less than  in 
the United States or Canada.  It is also notable  that  the secular  decline in 
Japanese  saving  is evident in all age groups, matching  the findings  from 
the other  two countries. 
Two features  of the Japanese  data  can affect  our  interpretation  of this 
pattern,  however. First, the measure  of saving available  to us is based 
on the change in asset holdings excluding capital gains. It includes as 
saving the net transfer  of wealth through  inheritance,  but inheritances 
are not included  in income. Second, it is much more common  in Japan 
for the elderly  to move in with  their  children  than  in the United States or 
Canada.  Such households  are classified  in Japan  by the age of the adult Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  219 
Table 9.  Age Distribution of Saving and Income, Japan,  1970-89 
Percent 
Age group 
National  Survey  Over 
Item  accounts  total  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  64 
Saving  ratea 
1970-74  19.4  28.1  23.4  29.1  25.1  34.8  31.3 
1980-84  17.0  20.5  18.8  21.1  19.6  23.7  18.4 
1985-89  15.4  23.6  22.0  25.0  21.6  27.8  18.2 
Age distribution 
1970-74  ...  100.0  20.6  34.2  23.3  14.8  7.3 
1980-84  ...  100.0  17.4  30.9  26.4  15.7  9.5 
1985-89  ...  100.0  12.9  30.3  25.5  19.2  11.9 
Relative  income 
1970-74  ...  100.0  80.2  98.2  117.3  107.5  94.4 
1980-84  ...  100.0  79.5  98.5  114.0  110.3  87.8 
198549  ...  100.0  77.7  97.0  118.0  107.3  81.7 
Source: Management  and  Coordination  Agency  (1988),  Family  Saving  Survey  from  Management  and  Coordination 
Agency  (various  years),  Japanese  national  accounts,  and authors'  calculations  as explained  in the text. Households 
are placed  in an age group  based  on the age of the head of the household. 
a. Saving  is measured  as the net accumulation  of financial  assets less the change  in liabilities  plus investment  in 
tangible  assets. It is expressed  as a percent  of after-tax  income. 
child. Thus, separate  households headed by someone over 65 years of 
age are more likely to be unusually wealthy, and the growth in the 
number  of such households  over time reflects, in part, a social trend  of 
reduced  dependency  of the retired  elderly  on their  children. 
The changing  age distribution  of Japanese  households  is shown in the 
middle of table 9. The changes are far more pronounced  than in the 
United States or Canada. The proportion  of households headed by 
someone under  age 35 has declined  by more than  a third  since the early 
1970s,  and  the proportion  headed  by someone over age 55 has increased 
by nearly  25 percent.40  On the other  hand,  the distribution  of household 
income, shown at the bottom  of the table, has changed  very little. There 
has been some decline in the relative  income of younger  and  much  older 
households,  but  the importance  of these shifts is small. 
Alternative  measures  of the trend in overall Japanese  saving, based 
on these household survey data, are shown in figure  4. The solid line 
shows the actual  rate  of total saving  reported  in the FSS. The dotted  line 
represents  the saving  rate  adjusted  to keep the Japanese  age distribution 
40. Households  headed  by someone under  the age of 25 are excluded  from  the table 
because  of small  sample  size. They  represent  a small  share  of all households. 220  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Figure 4.  Demographic  Effects on Household  Saving, Japan, 1968-89 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  using  Japan's  Family  Saving  Survey. 
a. The fixed-weight  saving rate is the saving rate adjusted  to keep the age and relative income distributions 
constant  at their 1968  levels. 
b. The demographic  component  of saving  is the saving  rate adjusted  to hold the saving  rate and relative  income 
of each age group  constant  at their 1968  levels. 
and  relative  income distribution  constant  at their 1968  levels (that  is, wit 
-  w0,968  and yit =  Yi,1968).  (The choice  of a base year for measuring w, 
and yi has no significant  influence  on the results.) The adjusted  saving 
rate is almost indistinguishable  from the actual rate, indicating  that 
nearly  all of the movement  in the aggregate  saving  rate can be traced  to 
the changes of saving  rates within  age groups. That  is, essentially all of 
the variation  in the saving rate is due to movements in si alone. The 
nearly horizontal broken line represents the saving rate holding the 
saving rate and relative incomes of different  age groups fixed at their 
1968 levels  (that is,  sit  =  si,1968  and yit =  Yi,1968).  The influence of 
demographic  change alone has been to increase the overall saving rate 
over the 1968-88 period.41  More important,  the differences in saving 
rates among age groups are simply not large enough to generate  major 
41. There  has been no significant  change  in the distribution  of household  income by 
age of the household  head.  That  specific  result  is not shown  in the figure. Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  221 
demographic  effects on the aggregate  saving  rate. While  there  is a secular 
correlation  between the aging  of the Japanese  population  and  the recent 
decline in household saving, the relationship  does not appear to be 
causal. 
The influence  of an increased  number  of retirees  on the saving  rate is 
potentially  obscured in the Japanese data by the tendency for elderly 
parents  to live with their children,  a factor that spreads  retirees' effect 
on saving over younger households. This explanation  for the survey 
results is unsatisfactory, however, because of the uniformity  of the 
decline  in saving  across the entire  age spectrum.  If the increased  number 
of elderly were contributing  to lower saving rates, we would expect to 
see the decline concentrated  in those households most likely to have 
elderly parents. In addition, the likelihood that parents will live with 
their children is declining, as suggested by the large increase in the 
number  of elderly  households  in the survey. 
The  distribution  of Japanese  household  saving  rates  by income  quintile 
is shown in table 10. The major  difference  from similar  tabulations  for 
the United States and Canada  is that Japanese  household saving rates 
are strongly  positive in the lower two quintiles, rather  than negative as 
in North America.  Household saving  rates do rise with income, but the 
extent of the increase is comparatively  small. In part, this difference 
may be due to the smaller  amount  of welfare  payments  in Japan,  which 
are often underreported  in the American  and Canadian  surveys. Still, it 
appears  that part  of the explanation  for high saving in Japan  is the high 
saving rate of low-income  groups. It is also interesting  to note that the 
range of relative incomes, while less  than in the United States, is 
comparable  to that in Canada. Nonetheless, the Japanese results are 
similar  to those for North America in implying  that saving rates have 
moved up and down across virtually  the entire income distribution.42 
Again, there appears  to be strong evidence of a common influence  on 
changes  in saving  rates over time. 
42. The saving rates reported  for the lower quintiles  of the all-households  sample 
would appear  to be an exception, but the sharp  drop in the saving rate for the 1980-88 
period  is concentratedjust  in two years.  As mentioned  previously,  it is difficult  to measure 
the saving  of the self-employed.  No such  sharp  decline  is shown  in the data  for  households 
headed  by a wage  and  salary  worker. 222  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 




Item  total  First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth 
All households 
Saving rate 
1970-74  28.1  24.6  23.2  26.3  27.3  31.2 
1980-84  20.5  10.9  18.7  19.5  20.5  23.8 
1985-89  23.6  18.0  25.0  21.8  24.2  24.6 
Relative  income 
1970-74  100.0  42.9  67.2  86.8  112.1  190.9 
1980-84  100.0  43.7  68.5  88.4  113.3  186.2 
1985-89  100.0  39.9  65.3  87.8  114.8  192.1 
Worker  households 
Saving rate 
1970-74  25.5  21.3  20.7  24.1  26.1  28.4 
1980-84  21.4  15.7  19.0  21.0  21.2  24.6 
1985-89  23.2  16.0  22.2  21.8  24.3  25.2 
Relative  income 
1970-74  100.0  50.7  72.4  90.1  112.6  174.2 
1980-84  100.0  51.6  73.4  91.6  114.0  169.3 
1985-89  100.0  48.2  71.9  91.8  115.1  172.3 
Source: See table  9. 
Implications  for the Decline  in Saving 
Our analysis leads to several conclusions  about the decline in house- 
hold saving rates. First, the data provide no support for arguments that 
the decline can be traced to reduced saving on the part of specific groups 
in the population,  such as members of the baby-boom  generation.  We 
find,  instead,  a common  pattern of  reduced  saving  within  nearly  all 
groups examined.  The drop in saving was,  however,  far larger among 
households  headed  by  someone  over  45 than among younger  house- 
holds. This pattern of saving decline could be attributable to the rise in 
real rates of return in the 1980s. Older households,  with substantial asset 
holdings at the start of the decade,  might respond to higher returns by 
raising their rate of consumption  out of current income.  This wealth 
effect of higher real returns would be far smaller among younger families, 
who possessed  fewer assets when rates of return soared. 
At  the  same  time,  we  find that  shifts  in  the  composition  of  the 
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married  couples and the middle-aged,  and groups that are low savers, 
like the young and the retired, have been inconsequential  as an expla- 
nation for the decline. We thus reject the prediction  that the private 
saving  rate  will necessarily  rise in the near  future  as the large  baby-boom 
cohort enters middle age. In fact, comparing  the variability  of each 
group's saving rate over time to the difference  in saving rates between 
the groups  leads us to question  the view that the overall saving  rate  will 
necessarily  decline  in  the longer  term  as the population  ages. An increase 
in  the  proportion  of elderly  households  could  easily  be offset  by increased 
rates of saving within various age groups, including  the elderly them- 
selves. The insignificance  of demographic  factors as an explanation  for 
past changes  in the saving  rate  in the United States is equally  applicable 
to saving  in Canada  and  Japan. 
We also find no evidence that U.S.  saving rates have changed by 
disproportionate  amounts  in different  parts of the income distribution. 
Instead, the saving rates of different  income classes have for the most 
part moved together. And, in the cases of Canada  and Japan, saving 
rates  of different  income  classes have moved  both  up  and  down  together. 
Our analysis of the role of capital gains as a factor in the decline of 
saving is less conclusive. We find no support  for the idea that reduced 
saving within the United States was concentrated  among consumers 
who held  financial  assets, the values of which soared  in the 1980s.  In any 
case, most of the drop  in U.S. saving  occurred  before  the boom in equity 
markets.  On the other hand, survey data  for the United States-though 
not for Canada-indicate that sharply higher home prices may have 
contributed  to the drop in saving. The falloff in saving was much more 
severe among U.S.  homeowners than among renters, suggesting  that 
capital  gains  on homes may have displaced  some household  saving. 
It is possible that these results simply reflect statistical  problems  in 
the surveys. If the results were based solely on a single survey, such as 
the CES, which obtained  saving as the difference  between income and 
consumption,  the drop  in the saving  rate  could  be explained  away as the 
result of differential  trends in the misreporting  of consumption and 
income.  For  that  reason,  we have  taken  some care  to evaluate  the quality 
of the survey data. Our  analysis suggests that changes in the quality  of 
the data  are not large  enough  to explain  the pattern  of results observed. 
Moreover,  our  conclusions  gain  added  credibility  because  they are  based 
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saving  in the United States. The additional  analyses of survey data  from 
Canada  and  Japan  confirm  the main  findings  from  the United States. The 
uniformity  of results  from  such a wide variety  of surveys seems reassur- 
ing. 
The striking  result  that  emerges  from  this study  is the extent to which 
the saving rates of most population  subgroups  change in parallel  over 
time. This result suggests that  the decline in saving  must involve one or 
more factors that affect the vast majority  of households uniformly.  In 
seeking  an explanation  for the drop  in saving,  we are  thus drawn  back  to 
macroeconomic  factors, rather than the demographic  and microeco- 
nomic determinants  that many  economists currently  find  so attractive. 
One possible explanation  for lower saving involves slower income 
growth. Most economists would agree that saving rates should be 
positively associated with income changes in the short run because of 
the dominant  role played by transitory  income movements over the 
business cycle. But this positive short-run  association  cannot  provide  a 
satisfactory  explanation  for the secular  decline  in saving,  which  has now 
lasted more  than  a decade. Is it possible that  a reduction  in the long-term 
growth  rate, arising  from slower  productivity  or labor  force growth,  has 
reduced saving? The secular decline in income growth has been pro- 
nouncedinthe  United  States  since  the early 1970s,  and  it is aphenomenon 
shared  by other  industrial  countries. 
The original formulation  of the life-cycle consumption model by 
Franco Modigliani  and others implied a positive relationship  between 
aggregate  saving rates and aggregate  income growth. The relationship 
was a key factor in subsequent  studies seeking to account for interna- 
tional differences in private saving rates.43  The connection between 
saving  and  income  growth,  however, resulted  solely from  the process of 
aggregation:  an increase  in the rate of income growth,  whether  because 
of increases  in population  or  productivity,  raised  the incomes  of workers 
(who save) relative  to those of retirees  (who dissave), thus boosting  the 
weights  attached  to saving  cohorts  and  reducing  the weights  attached  to 
dissaving  cohorts in the determination  of aggregate  saving. There  is no 
implied  association  between saving and expected income growth  at the 
level of the individual  household. We have already shown, however, 
43. The argument  is laid  out in Modigliani  (1966),  and  empirical  support  is provided  in 
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that  the redistribution  of income  among  saving  and  dissaving  age groups 
has played only a small role in recent movements  in the private  saving 
rate. Thus, the link suggested  by Modigliani  and others explains  at best 
a minor  part  of the recent decline in saving. 
In addition,  James  Tobin and M. J. Farrell  challenged  the generality 
of even this link, noting  that  it depended  upon  Modigliani's  assumptions 
that  consumers  do not anticipate  higher  levels of future  income and  that 
they dissave only during  retirement."  In the traditional  life-cycle model, 
current  consumption  is a function  of lifetime  resources, which  is the sum 
of current  wealth and the present discounted  value of expected future 
labor income. Modigliani's  version of the life-cycle model, however, 
assumes that consumers do not incorporate  expected future income 
growth  into  their  computation  of lifetime  resources.  Alternatively,  under 
the assumption  of perfect  foresight,  expectations  of higher  future  income 
growth will lead individual  households to consume more today, post- 
poning saving until it is less costly in terms of forgone consumption. 
That is, expectations of higher income growth should reduce current 
saving within each age cohort, offsetting the effect arising from the 
redistribution  of income toward  high-saving  groups.45 
In evaluating the effect of changes in income growth on saving 
behavior  we must  therefore  consider  two separate  influences:  the impact 
of income growth on the behavior of an individual  household and its 
effect on the distribution  of income across different age cohorts. If 
individual  households are forward-looking  in making  consumption  de- 
cisions, their  current  saving  should  be negatively  related  to the expected 
rate of income growth. On the other hand, if expectations  are static, as 
assumed  by Modigliani,  a household's  current  saving  rate is unaffected 
by income growth.  In both models the redistribution  of income in favor 
of wage earners, who save,  and away from retirees, who dissave, 
contributes  toward  a positive relationship  between the aggregate  saving 
rate  and  income  growth.  In simulation  models  that  incorporate  forward- 
looking expectations, Tobin found that the within-cohort  effect domi- 
44. Tobin  (1967)  and  Farrell  (1970). 
45. The importance  of the within-cohort  negative  effect of income  growth  will  depend 
upon the age of the cohorts enjoying  faster income growth. For those who are close to 
retirement,  the present  value of expected future  income  growth  will be small  relative  to 
current  wealth.  The importance  of this effect may  also be limited  among  the young  if they 
are  constrained  in their  opportunities  to borrow  against  future  earnings. 226  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
nated,  producing  a negative  overall  relationship  between  income  growth 
and  aggregate  saving.  The results  in this paper  also imply  that  the effects 
of income redistribution  are comparatively  minor, supporting  Tobin's 
conclusion. 
Most empirical research suggests that the life-cycle hypothesis is 
correct in emphasizing  that households  discount short-run  fluctuations 
in their income when determining  current  consumption  and that retire- 
ment is one important  motive for saving. There is competing  evidence, 
however,  that  consumption  is more  volatile  and  closely related  to current 
income changes  than  would be consistent with the complete smoothing 
of consumption  over full lifetime  resources.46  While  households  may be 
aware of the age profile of earnings  for their own occupations when 
planning  their  saving,  few of them appear  to incorporate  information  on 
variations  in the growth of economywide earnings  into their expecta- 
tions. Instead, we observe a tendency for households to steadily, but 
gradually,  build  up their  wealth, increasing  their  rates of saving  in peak 
earning  years and as they approach  retirement  age. The implication  of 
the life-cycle model that households have a target  wealth-income  ratio 
that increases  up to retirement  appears  valid;  but the assumption  of the 
forward-looking  expectations version that the target at each age is 
negatively  affected  by income  growth  lacks empirical  support.47 
If there is a reasonably stable wealth-income  target at each age, it 
would not be surprising  if private  saving has an accelerator  component 
similar  to that  of investment.  Thus, the rate  of saving  would  rise and  fall 
with the rate  of the growth  of income. If 
St=  Wt-  Wt  ,where 
W=  pY; 
then 
St=  (Yt-  Yt),  and 
StlYt=  P (Yt  -  Yt-,)Iyt. 
Thus, if there is a stable wealth-income  target at each age, ,B,  saving 
rates will be positively related to the rate of income growth. Since the 
46. See, for example,  Hall and Mishkin  (1982),  Skinner  (1988),  Zeldes (1989),  and in 
particular  Carroll  and  Summers  (1989). 
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household  wealth-income  ratio  is about  3.5, we would  expect the saving 
rate  to change  in the long run  by about  3.5 percentage  points  for every 1 
percent change in the growth  rate. Income per capita grew at a rate of 
3.2 percent annually  between 1960 and 1973, compared with just 1.5 
percent  annually  from  1972  to the  present.  If  at  a given  age  each  household 
attempted simply to hold the ratio of income to wealth constant, the 
secular  decline  in saving  would  be about  6 percentage  points  of income- 
more than we have observed in the United States. It is noteworthy 
that the decline in saving has not been reflected in a lower wealth- 
income ratio in this country, even if we exclude capital gains during 
the 1980s. 
The  hypothesis  that  slower  income  growth  is the  cause of lower  saving 
is attractive for two reasons. First, if true it would explain a dual 
phenomenon  that is nearly  universal  among  major  industrial  countries: 
rates of both saving and income growth have been simultaneously 
declining.  We need some such cause to account  for the pervasiveness  of 
the decline in saving rates. Second, this hypothesis would help explain 
the drop in saving across such a broad cross-section of households- 
young and  old, rich and  poor, equity holders  and debtors. If the decline 
in saving rates does result from slower rates of economic growth, we 
should be extremely skeptical  that private saving will recover anytime 
soon. The  problem  is that  the hypothesis  is in direct  conflict  with  popular 
theoretical  models of consumers  who base their decisions on forward- 
looking, rational  expectations. 
APPENDIX 
Description  of the Data 
IN  THIS APPENDIX we  document the adjustments to national income 
account (NIA) data required  to make these data compatible  with the 
"survey" concepts of saving  rates. The areas  that  are  treated  differently 
in the NIA and survey data involve employer  contributions  to pension 
funds, homeownership,  depreciation, and third-party  payments. The 
appendix also describes the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the 
Survey  of Consumer  Finances.  The appendix  concludes  with  an  analysis 
of the quality  of the data  from  the surveys. 228  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Table Al.  Translation of National Accounting Concepts of Income and Consumption 
to a Cash Accounting Basis, United States,  1989 
Billions  of dollars,  except  where  noted 
National  Cash 
accounting  accounting 
Item  concept  Adjustments  basis 
Wages  and salaries  2,573.2 
-Imputations (t8.9, 40)  11.5 
Adjusted  value  2,561.7 
Plus: other  labor  income  241.9 
-Employer contributions  (t6.13, 20)  237.1 
+ Benefits  paid (t6.13, 28)  347.0 
-Group health  benefits  (t6.13, 30)  155.6 
Adjusted  value  196.2 
Plus: proprietor  income  379.3 
-Capital cons. adj.-farm (tl.14, 14)  -7.7 
-Capital cons. adj.-nonfarm (tl.14, 16)  32.8 
-  Imputations  (t8.9, 46)  8.3 
Adjusted  value  345.9 
Plus: rental  income  8.2 
-Capital consumption  adjustment  (tl.14, 19)  -55.8 
-  Owner-occupied  rental  income  (t8.6, 4)  15.8 
Adjusted  value  48.2 
Plus: dividend  income  114.4  114.4 
Plus: interest  income  643.2 
-Imputed rental  income (t8.8, 48)  252.2 
-Nonprofit institutions  (t8.14, 7)  36.5 
Adjusted  value  354.5 
Plus: transfers  636.9 
-Hospital and supplemental  medical  (t3.11, 5)  97.9 
-  Military  medical  insurance  (t3.  11, 17)  1.3 
- Other  federal  transfers  (t3.  11, 27)  11.9 
-Public assistance  medical  care (t3.  11, 34)  62.9 
-  Other  public  assistance  (t3.  11, 39)  2.7 
- Education  transfers  (t3.  11, 40)  4.8 
-Employment and training  (t3.11, 41)  1.0 
-Business transfers  (tI.9, 7)  32.4 
Adjusted  value  422.0 
Less: personal  contributions  for social insurance  212.8  212.8 
(Continued) 
Adjustment of NIA Data 
Four major  adjustments  must be made to NIA data to bring them 
closer to the saving  recorded  on household  surveys;  the adjustments  for 
1989 are presented in table Al.  First, national accounting methods 
attribute  the accumulation  of reserves  within  private  pension  and  welfare 
funds as household saving. The NIA counts employer  contributions  to Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  229 
Table Al  (continued) 
National  Cash 
accounting  accouniting 
Item  concept  Adjustments  basis 
Equals:  personal  income  4,384.3 
Adjusted  value  3,830.1 
Less: personal tax and nontax  payments  658.8 
-Nontaxes-tuition  (t3.4, 16)  17.6 
-Nontaxes-hospital  charges  (t3.4, 17)  41.3 
Adjusted  value  599.9 
Equals:  disposable  income  3,725.5 
Adjusted  value  3,230.2 
Minus:  consumption  expenditures  3,450.1 
+ Medical  adjustments  -276.4 
+Nontaxes-hospital charges  (t3.4, 17)  41.3 
-Hospital and suppl.  medical  (t3.11, 5)  97.9 
-  Military  medical  insurance  (t3.  11, 17)  1.3 
-Public assistance  medical  (t3.11, 34)  62.9 
-Group health  payments  (t6.13, 30)  155.6 
+ Education  adjustments  9.1 
+Nontaxes-tuition (t3.4, 16)  17.6 
-Education transfers  (t3.11, 40)  4.8 
-Employment and training  (t3.11,  41)  1.0 
-  Other  public  assistance  (t3.  11, 39)  2.7 
+Housing adjustments  -92.2 
+ Indirect  taxes (t8.9, 88  + 96)  61.4 
+Intermediate  goods (t8.9, 85+93)  47.2 
+Net interest  (t8.9, 90+97)  197.1 
-Space  rent (t8.9, 84  +92)  371.1 
-Nonprofit institutions  (t8.9, 99)  26.8 
+ Other  consumption  adjustments  -  114.0 
-Services  without  payment  (t8.9, 103)  90.3 
- Product  consumed  on farms  (t8.9, 108)  0.3 
-Wage imputations  (t8.9, 40)  11.5 
- Other  transfers  (t3.  11, 27)  11.9 
Adjusted  value  2,976.6 
Minus:  interest  paid by consumers  to business  102.2  102.2 
Minus:  transfer  payments  to foreigners  1.4  1.4 
Equals:  saving  171.8 
Adjusted  value  150.0 
Saving  rate (percent)  4.6 
Adjusted  value  4.6 
Source: National  Income  and Product  Accounts.  Symbols  in parentheses  refer  to NIA table  and line numbers. 
these funds  as a component  of employee compensation  and records  the 
investment income of  the funds as personal interest income. In a 
household survey, by contrast, respondents report the cash benefit 
payments  from  the  funds  as income,  but  do not  report  as income  employer 
contributions  to the funds or the investment  income of the funds. The 
accumulation  of reserves  in the funds  is thus  excluded  from  both  income 230  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
and saving  in the household  surveys. When  there is a positive accumu- 
lation in pension reserves, as there has been in recent decades, the 
survey measures  of income and saving  will be lower than  the equivalent 
measures in the national accounts. The adjustment  we make to the 
national  accounts  to eliminate  this discrepancy  is fairly  straightforward. 
Second, homeownership is treated as a business in the national 
accounts. Rental  costs are an imputed  part  of consumption  outlays. All 
maintenance,  depreciation,  property  taxes, and mortgage  interest ex- 
penses are allocated as business expenses. The residual net profit of 
homeownership,  if any, is counted as part of personal rental income. 
This treatment  of homeownership  will have little impact on saving as 
long  as the residual  net profit  is small.  In  recent  years, homeowners  have 
suffered a net loss  on homeownership  in the NIA; expenses have 
exceeded imputed  rental  income, thus reducing  both income and saving 
below the levels that would be recorded in a household survey. In 
addition, the surveys ignore most elements of housing depreciation, 
because depreciation  is not paid for with a cash outlay. The survey- 
based estimate of saving, obtained as the difference between income 
and consumption  expenditures,  is thus higher  than that in the national 
accounts. 
Third,  the national  accounts  measure  business  income  after  deducting 
capital  depreciation  at current  replacement  costs rather  than  at historical 
cost as done in U.S. tax law. Household survey reports  of net business 
income probably  reflect  private  accounting  practice, which is driven  by 
tax law. Since the tax law frequently provides for a more generous 
depreciation  allowance than the national accounts, the surveys may 
show a lower level of net business income and saving for the self- 
employed. 
Finally, a substantial  number  of third-party  payments-particularly 
for medical  care-are  added  to both  household  income  and  expenditures 
in the national  accounts. These payments are seldom recorded  in the 
household surveys. Because the adjustments  affect both income and 
consumption  by the same amount,  they have little effect on saving. 
Consumer Expenditure Surveys 
Our  analysis  is based on U.S. data  from  the 1972  and 1973  Consumer 
Expenditure  Surveys and from more recent CES stretching  over the Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  231 
period from 1982 through 1985. The sample drawn in the survey is a 
stratified  random  sample  that  is intended  to represent  all urban  and  rural 
households in the United States. Because of budgetary  constraints  in 
the early 1980s,  however, only urban  households  were sampled  during 
several  early  quarters  of the decade. In order  to keep our  samples  strictly 
comparable  over time, we have restricted  our analysis to urban  house- 
holds, which comprise 83 percent of all households and account for a 
somewhat  higher  percentage  of consumption  and  income. 
The 1972-73  surveys were conducted  on a calendar-year  basis, using 
a separate sample of about 10,000 consumer units, or households, in 
each of the two years. In the 1980s  new households  were added to the 
survey on a continuous basis, so the income and consumption of a 
particular  household did not necessarily cover a single calendar  year. 
Allowing  for nonresponses  (including  vacancies), the number  of usable 
interviews covers between 5,000 and 6,700 households a quarter.  Re- 
spondents  are weighted to reflect their probability  of being included  in 
the sample,  and  the sums  of weights  within  particular  age, sex, and  racial 
groups  are calibrated  to match  those in the Current  Population  Survey. 
The Census Bureau  attempts  to interview  households  included  in the 
CES five times over the course of a year. The first interview  provides 
data on the household's baseline characteristics, which are used to 
classify the household  for analysis and as a check on future  responses 
about new purchases  of consumer durables.  None of this expenditure 
informaition  appears on the public use tapes available to us. In each 
subsequent  interview, retrospective  information  is obtained about ex- 
penditures during the previous quarter. Interviewers collect family 
income  information  on the second and  fifth  quarterly  interviews.  Unfor- 
tunately,  the data  tapes for the 1980s  contain  top-coded  values on some 
income items for households with high reported  incomes. Income and 
consumption  values above some top-code  level, such  as $100,000  a year, 
are  recorded  on the tape  as simply  $100,000.  The exceptional  severity  of 
the top coding  has led us to exclude data  from 1980  and 1981,  but  the top 
coding has only a minimal  effect on the surveys conducted after 1981. 
We also exclude  from  the 1972-73  sample  individual  households  with  an 
absolute  value  of saving  greater  than  $100,000.  Such  values  of household 
saving are by definition  excluded in 1982-85  because of the top coding 
of income  in that  period. 
To make the data usable in our analysis, we have rearranged  the 
structure  of the original  data. Extensive restructuring  is needed to make 232  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
the data comparable  to CES data  collected in the 1970s;  as a result, our 
tabulations  do not correspond  to those published  by the Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics.  The quarterly  files  from  the 1980s  were processed  to construct 
data  records  for  each household  on a  full  reporting-year  basis, rather  than 
on a quarterly  basis. Thus, each household  is identified  by the quarter  in 
which it first  contributed  usable consumption  information;  information 
from the subsequent  three interviews is then matched  with this initial 
consumption  information  and included  on the same household  record. 
The income reported  in the fifth  quarterly  interview  covers exactly the 
same period covered by the consumption  data;  it is the income we use 
in our  analysis.48  Because  the surveys  in  the 1980s  did  not obtain  accurate 
measures  of income  tax liabilities,  we have  been forced  to impute  income 
taxes using information  on family characteristics, taxable income re- 
ported  in the fifth  interview,  and the relevant  tax laws of each year.49 
Our  sample  consists of the urban  households  drawn  in both the 1972- 
73 surveys and the 14 separate quarterly samples entering the CES 
between the first  quarter  of 1982  and the second quarter  of 1985.  The 13 
quarterly  samples  entering  the CES since 1986  could not be used in this 
study because of an apparent decline in the quality of income and 
consumption reports. The initial number of households entering the 
survey in each quarter during the  1980s was approximately 1,200. 
Because of attrition  and incomplete  income or consumption  reporting, 
the usable sample  in each quarter  was reduced  to about 650-850 house- 
holds. We adjusted  the sample  weights in the final  analysis  file to reflect 
the sample  loss caused by attrition.50 
The quarterly  samples  in the 1980s  are too small  for any disaggregate 
analysis, so we combined the samples from contiguous quarters.  The 
combination  of samples  from different  periods  gives rise to a complica- 
48. Our estimates of aggregate  income differ therefore  from those reported  in the 
published summaries  of the CES data. Instead of reporting  the annual  income totals 
obtained  in the fifth  interview,  the BLS averages  in many  responses  taken  from  the second 
interview.  However,  the second  interview  collects income  information  covering  an  earlier 
period  than  that  covered  by the consumption  data,  so we cannot  use it in our  analysis.  Our 
procedure  is equivalent  to the one used by the BLS in the 1972-73  surveys. 
49. The 1972-73  surveys  include  good  information  on tax liabilities.  To ensure  that  the 
tax data  for the 1980s  would  align  with  those from  the 1970s,  we use the ratio  of personal 
taxes to personal  income  from  the national  accounts  as an index to adjust  the level of the 
average  tax rate  in each sample  from  the 1980s. 
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tion, however. Inflation  and  rising  real incomes will tend to increase  the 
implicit weights of observations that are drawn in later quarters.  To 
minimize  this influence,  we have deflated  the incomes and  consumption 
expenditures reported by  households drawn in later quarters. Our 
deflator  was calculated based on the rate of increase in nominal per 
capita disposable income reported in the national income accounts. 
Income and consumption  in the samples  for the 1980s  were deflated  by 
1982  (first  quarter)  dollars,  and income and  consumption  in the samples 
for the 1970s  were deflated  by 1972  dollars.  For analytical  purposes,  the 
data  were combined  into two samples: 1972-73  (14,079  cases) and 1982- 
85 (9,739 cases). At the end of this appendix  we consider  the accuracy 
of the income and  consumption  data  in the CES. 
Survey of Consumer Finances 
The 1963  Survey of Financial  Characteristics  of Consumers  and the 
1983 Survey of Consumer Finances were undertaken  to estimate the 
asset holdings  and  debt  obligations  of a nationally  representative  sample 
of U.S. families. The data  permit  us to analyze the net financial  position 
of families, their holdings  of various types of assets, and the level and 
sources of their debt obligations. Both surveys were followed by rein- 
terviews  with many  of the original  respondents.  Unfortunately,  the 1986 
reinterview  managed  to cover only a subsample  of original  respondents 
and was limited  to a relatively  short  telephone questionnaire.  Nonethe- 
less, interviewers  succeeded  in  maintaining  a high  degree  of participation 
among high-income  households.51 The 1986 SCF reinterview sample 
includes 2,536 households, while the 1963 reinterview covers  1,679 
households.  These are the samples  available  to us for analysis. 
In spite of  the obvious care used in collecting the data, many 
respondents  reported  wealth  levels on the two SCF reinterview  surveys 
that are difficult  to reconcile with their reported  incomes or receipts of 
gifts and  inheritances  between the two surveys. Although  some of these 
reports were no doubt accurate, many were probably incorrect. We 
excluded certain classes of  respondents to minimize the impact of 
51. See Avery, Elliehausen,  and Kennickell  (1988)  and  the citations  they mention  for 
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reporting  error.  All households  headed  by someone under  the age of 25 
were excluded, as were households  in which the head  reported  a change 
in marital  status between the two surveys. We also excluded the few 
households  that  reported  saving,  exclusive  of capital  gains,  that  exceeded 
their  income plus reported  gifts between the two surveys. An important 
exclusion is our elimination  of households with substantial  wealth in 
their own businesses. Not  only is  the reported income from such 
businesses subject  to great  error,  the valuation  of the business assets is 
also problematical.  We therefore  excluded those households  for which 
the value of own business  exceeded 10  percent  of the household's  initial 
wealth. (This  particular  restriction  eliminated  339  households  in the 1963 
survey and 541 households in the 1986 survey.) Taken together, the 
sample exclusions left us with a total of 1,211 households in 1963  and 
1,806  households  in 1986. 
An estimate  of saving obtained  by comparing  wealth holdings  at two 
points in time is not comparable  with saving measured  in the national 
income accounts because the latter  measure  excludes capital  gains and 
losses. In order to calculate a household's saving exclusive of capital 
gains  and  losses, it is necessary  to form  an estimate  of capital  gains  from 
the SCF data. We estimated  such gains for owners of corporate  stocks 
by assuming that equity holders on the initial interview should have 
experienced gains on their original  holdings in proportion  to the per- 
centage rise in the Standard  and Poor's index between the first and 
second interviews. Obviously, this assumption  will overstate gains for 
some households  and  understate  gains  for others. On  balance,  however, 
it should  provide  a reasonable  estimate  of gains  for average  households. 
Questions in the follow-up SCF interview  make it possible to trace the 
sources of change in the value of real property,  including  additions  to 
old properties,  sales, and purchases  of new properties.  Corporate  bond 
holdings  were reported  at book value, both on the initial  and follow-up 
surveys. 
Quality of the Survey Data 
The Census Bureau  and  BLS have published  detailed  analyses of the 
consumption  data reported  in the CES, and the Federal Reserve has 
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SCF.52  Robert  Avery, Gregory  Elliehausen,  and  Arthur  Kennickell  show 
that estimates of aggregate  family holdings  of most financial  assets and 
debts calculated  from the full SCF compare favorably  with estimates 
from  the Flow of Funds.53  Publicly  traded  stock and  bond estimates  are 
within  2 percent  of the Flow of Funds  totals. Mutual  fund shares, home 
mortgages,  and installment  debt also compare  closely. The SCF totals 
do differ  for  checking  and  saving  accounts,  real  estate, household-owned 
businesses, and other household  debt. The SCF totals may actually  be 
preferable  to those in the Flow of Funds in the case of depository 
accounts and household  debt, but it is likely that the SCF estimates of 
business and real-estate holdings are deficient. For that reason, we 
exclude respondents  with substantial  business assets. 
Average  money income  reported  in the SCF is somewhat  higher  than 
income reported in the CPS, the Census Bureau's main source of 
information  on the distribution  of household  income. The difference  is 
primarily  due to defects in the CPS rather  than  the SCF. Some sources 
of income, such as wages and salaries and government  transfers, are 
slightly  underreported  in the SCF. But most sources  of income  for  which 
there  is a large  discrepancy  between the totals on the SCF and the CPS 
are much more accurately reported on the SCF. In particular,  total 
business  income, dividends,  and  trust  and  rental  income  are  much  higher 
on the SCF than the CPS. These income items are known to be poorly 
recorded  on the CPS.54  The better  performance  of the SCF can undoubt- 
edly be traced to the enrollment  of a high-income  subsample  in that 
survey. On  balance,  the SCF appears  to provide  a fairly  accurate  picture 
of the American  wealth  and  income distribution  at a given point  in time. 
Its accuracy in measuring changes in household assets is less well 
documented. 
The saving  data  in the CES have not been examined  as extensively as 
the wealth data  in the SCF, although  the Census Bureau  and BLS have 
compared the consumption totals recorded in the CES with totals 
reported  in external data sources.55  We have partially  replicated the 
52. See Pearl  (1978, 1979),  Gieseman  (1987),  and  Avery, Elliehausen,  and  Kennickell 
(1988). 
53. Avery, Elliehausen,  and  Kennickell  (1988). 
54. See Avery,  Elliehausen,  and  Kennickell  (1988,  table  2). The  income  underreporting 
problem  on the CPS  is discussed  in U.S. Bureau  of the Census  (1989). 
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Table A2.  Per Capita Income, Consumption, and Saving in the National Income 
Accounts and Consumer Expenditure Survey,  1972-73 and 1983-84 
NIA per capita  Ratio of CES to NIA 
(dollars)  (percent)a 
Item  1972-73  1983-4  1972-73  1983-4 
Total  income  4,662  11,552  90.8  84.6 
Wages  and salaries  3,197  7,429  104.2  102.7 
Social security  230  742  87.0  84.0 
Other  pensions  121  504  73.6  72.0 
All other  income  1,114  2,877  55.2  40.0 
Taxes  839  2,181  88.9  86.8b 
Disposable  income  3,823  9,371  91.2  84.1 
Consumption  spending  and 
personal  interest  3,507  8,963  85.1  80.2 
Durable  goods  562  1,326  90.2  84.0 
Nondurable  goods  1,523  3,542  71.8  72.2 
Services  1,322  3,810  101.7  89.6 
Personal  interest  100  285  39.0  35.1 
Saving  316  408  159.5  169.5 
Saving  rate (percent)  8.3  4.4  174.8  201.6 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  NIA and  CES data. For full description,  see Sabelhaus  (1990c). 
a. CES per capita  amounts  are calculated  for urban  households  that  remained  in the sample  for all interviews  and 
provided  complete  income  information.  Sample  weights  of included  households  are adjusted  for attrition  bias using 
homeownership  status,  race, and  age of the head  of the household. 
b. The 1983-84  CES value of taxes includes  personal  income  taxes estimated  by authors. 
Census Bureau and BLS analyses of consumption  and supplemented 
them  with an analysis  of the income reported  in the CES. 
Table  A2 shows per capita  levels of income, consumption,  and  saving 
in the national income accounts. It also shows how closely average 
income and consumption  responses in the CES match the per capita 
levels recorded in the national  accounts. All items, except for taxes, 
appear  to be more  poorly  reported  on the 1983-84  CES than  on the 1972- 
73 CES. Wages and salaries, social security, and other pensions are 
approximately  as well reported  in the 1980s  as in the 1970s, but most 
other sources of  income, especially income from capital and self- 
employment,  are  more  poorly  reported  in  the  later  surveys.  Consumption 
spending  also suffers  from  less accurate  reporting  in the 1980s  surveys, 
but because the proportional  rise in underreporting  of income was even 
larger,  the saving  rate  appears  to fall sharply. 
The statistics  shown in table  A2 can be used to evaluate  the potential 
effects of misreporting.  For example, the CES saving rate in the 1972- 
73 period was 14.4 percent.56  If the NIA saving rate is viewed as the 
56. For  two reasons  this saving  rate  will  not exactly  correspond  to the CES saving  rate 
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correct  estimate  of the aggregate  saving  rate, the estimate  of saving  from 
the CES would  have declined  between 1972-73  and 1984  simply  because 
of greater  underreporting  of income relative to consumption. If CES 
households had underreported  their consumption  and income by the 
same percentage  in 1972-73  as they did  in 1983-84,  the observed saving 
rate in the  1972-73 period would have been just  12.5 percent, 1.9 
percentage points below the rate actually recorded by the CES. The 
saving  rate  observed  in  the 1983-84  CES  was 8.9 percent-5.5 percentage 
points  below the rate  recorded  in the 1972-73  CES. Thus, approximately 
a third  of the decline is attributable  to the changing  pattern  of income 
and  consumption  misreporting.  About  two-thirds  of the decline  is due to 
a genuine drop in saving. The CES apparently  captures  the decline in 
personal saving, but exaggerates  its size. Statistics on saving derived 
from  the CES should  be interpreted  with this limitation  in mind. 
Table A3 supplements the information  in table A2 by showing a 
comparison  of the age distribution  of income reported  in the CES and 
CPS. The income figures  in the 1973-74  CES closely match  those in the 
1973-74  CPS. The correspondence  between the two surveys is not as 
good in 1984.  The  falloff  in the quality  of CES income  data  is particularly 
severe in the case of households  headed  by someone over the age of 45. 
This conclusion  corresponds  to our  earlier  finding  that self-employment 
income and  income  from  capital  were more  poorly  reported  on the CES 
in the 1980s  than  in the 1970s.  Older  people  typically  derive  more  of their 
income  from  self-employment  and  returns  on capital. 
The CES/CPS  ratios shown in table A3 suggest the possibility of a 
bias  in  measuring  the  change  in  saving  among  older  age  groups.  Sabelhaus 
considered  this possibility in a recent study.57  Making  suitable adjust- 
ments for the apparent  underreporting  of different  elements of income 
and consumption, he  showed that the adjusted CES data imply a 
reduction  in the saving  rate  of all age groups  between  the 1972-73  period 
and  the early 1980s,  with the exception of the oldest age group. 
Finally, tables A4-A6 present  the standard  errors  of the saving  rates 
computed  for various  subgroups  recorded  in the CES and SCF data. As 
headed  by someone  under  the age  of 25, whereas  the text tables  exclude  such  households. 
Second, to make  the CES data  precisely  match  those in the NIA, we have restricted  our 
sample  in table A2 to CES households  that provided  income and consumption  data for 
calendar  years 1983 and 1984. The sample analyzed in the text includes households 
reporting  income  and  consumption  for the period  1982-85. 
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Table A5.  Saving Rates and Standard Errors by Income, from Survey of Consumer 
Finances and Consumer Expenditure Survey,  1963-85 
Percent of after-tax income 
Income quintile 
First  Fifth 
Survey  (bottom)  Secotnd  Middle  Fourth  (top)  Total 
Survey  of Consumer  Finances 
1963  -0.31  7.93  15.36  13.48  16.51  14.04 
(2.05)  (2.31)  (1.36)  (1.34)  (1.57)  (1.00) 
1983-85  - 2.36  -2.91  10.00  9.87  12.45  9.48 
(2.56)  (1.81)  (2.75)  (1.75)  (1.39)  (1.05) 
Change  - 2.05  -10.84  - 5.36  -3.61  -4.06  -4.56 
(3.28)  (2.93)  (3.07)  (2.21)  (2.09)  (1.45) 
Consumer  Expenditure  Survey 
1972-73  -45.39  -1.49  9.00  17.54  28.64  15.07 
(2.22)  (1.07)  (0.73)  (0.51)  (0.64)  (0.40) 
1982-85  -92.09  -10.25  8.68  16.68  25.81  10.84 
(5.66)  (1.32)  (0.84)  (0.74)  (0.75)  (0.54) 
Change  -46.70  - 8.76  -0.32  - 0.86  - 2.83  -4.23 
(6.08)  (1.70)  (1.1  1)  (0.90)  (0.98)  (0.67) 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  SCF  and  CES  data.  Bootstrap  estimates  of standard  errors  are  in parentheses. 
Table A6.  Saving Rates and Standard Errors by Asset Ownership, from Survey of 
Consumer Finances and Consumer Expenditure Survey,  1963-85 
Percent of after-tax income 
Stock- or bondholder  Homeowner 
Survey  Yes  No  Yes  No  Total 
Survey of Consumer Finances 
1963  15.55  12.65  15.24  11.48  14.04 
(1.50)  (0.98)  (1.03)  (1.03)  (1.00) 
1983-85  11.47  7.82  8.95  10.99  9.48 
(1.85)  (0.82)  (1.12)  (2.11)  (1.05) 
Change  -4.08  -4.83  -6.29  -0.49  -4.56 
(2.39)  (1.27)  (1.53)  (2.35)  (1.45) 
Consumer Expenditure Survey 
1972-73  20.15  10.73  17.60  8.99  15.07 
(0.53)  (0.61)  (0.53)  (0.81)  (0.40) 
1982-85  15.76  8.17  12.08  7.08  10.84 
(0.79)  (0.71)  (0.66)  (0.84)  (0.54) 
Change  -4.39  - 2.56  - 5.52  -  1.91  -4.23 
(0.95)  (0.94)  (0.85)  (1.17)  (0.67) 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  SCF  and  CES  data.  Bootstrap  estimates  of standard  errors  are  in parentheses. Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  241 
mentioned earlier, we employ the bootstrap method to estimate the 
standard  errors  because direct  computation  of variability  is problemati- 
cal. Table  A4 shows that across age subgroups  the standard  error  of the 
saving  rate is larger  in the SCF sample  than in the CES. Differences  in 
saving rates between the two survey dates are statistically  significant, 
however, for all but the youngest age groups. The results in tables A5 
and  A6, which  describe  the effects of income  and  asset ownership,  while 
more mixed, also hold to this general  pattern-the  standard  errors  for 
the SCF data are larger  than those for the CES data, but most changes 
between survey  dates are statistically  significant. Comments 
and Discussion 
James M.  Poterba: Many papers have documented the decline in 
national  saving  in the United States and  other  developed nations  during 
the last decade. Although some analysts have attributed  this change 
largely to fiscal policy, both personal and government saving have 
declined relative to  GNP during this period. This paper by Barry 
Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus tackles the difficult 
problem  of explaining  the changes in household saving rates. It rejects 
some explanations  of the decline, such as shifting  demographics,  and 
provides a substantial  body of evidence that is consistent with many 
different explanations. One hypothesis the authors stress, because 
saving  rates for homeowners  fell faster than  those for nonhomeowners, 
is the possibility that homeowners  were consuming  their accumulated 
capital  gains  on housing  during  the 1980s  and  thereby  depressed  personal 
saving. My comments  will focus on evaluating  how the new evidence on 
household saving rates affects the plausibility  of various explanations 
for the falling saving rate. I will also address the question of housing 
wealth and saving  behavior  in some detail. 
The one hypothesis that this paper clearly rejects-the  view that 
shifting  demographics  explain  falling  saving-could  be rejected  in many 
ways, even without  this paper.  If differences  in age-specific  saving  rates 
are relatively  small, a rejection  of demographic  causes follows immedi- 
ately, particularly  because demographic  changes have been relatively 
small over the period of falling saving rates.' Unfortunately, other 
explanations  of the saving decline cannot be refuted or supported  so 
readily. 
The authors  uncover  three stylized facts about  personal  saving  in the 
1. This  argument  is developed  in more  detail  by Summers  and  Carroll  (1987). 
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United  States  over the last  few decades:  (1) saving  rates  for  all  age  groups 
have declined;  (2) saving  rates for young households  have declined  less 
than saving rates for older households; and (3) saving rates of home- 
owners have declined by more than saving rates of renters. These 
findings  can be used to evaluate the four leading explanations  of the 
saving  decline. 
First, the declining  need for old-age  income security  may have led to 
the saving decline. The finding of  larger saving reductions among 
households in the traditional  retirement  saving years, ages 45-65, pro- 
vides important  support  for this view. In 1970  the poverty  rate  for  elderly 
Americans  was 2.2 times the national  poverty rate. By the late 1980s, 
however, the poverty rate was lower among elderly Americans than 
among younger households.  The  increasing generosity  of  social 
security and the diffusion of private pension plans have raised the 
standard  of living for elderly households, resulting in less need for 
traditional  personal  saving  for retirement. 
The second explanation  concerns  the reduced  need for precautionary 
saving. This explanation  overlaps in part with the previous one, since 
an important  motive for precautionary  saving may be the provision of 
health  care during  old age. Despite cries about  the uninsured  population 
in the United States, a higher share of individuals are covered by 
insurance  today than in the past. The safety net for some catastrophic 
needs, notably  medical  emergencies,  has become tighter  over time. This 
may  have  reduced  household  incentives  for  precautionary  saving.  Which 
age groups would be most directly affected? Older households for 
medical emergencies, but younger households for disability or other 
risks  that  reduce  income potential. 
The third  explanation  considers  the reduced  need for "target  saving" 
to be a result  of easier access to credit. The sharp  increase  in consumer 
credit  relative  to income (if not assets) in the early 1980s,  as well as the 
apparent  decline in some measures  of accumulation  such as downpay- 
ment levels by first-time  homebuyers, suggests that households may 
need to do less saving  before major  purchases.  This could contribute  to 
reduced  saving among  younger  households, but should have relatively 
little effect on older households with substantial  accumulated  wealth. 
The  rise of credit  lines backed  by home  equity, one example  of increased 
credit  access, could have a particularly  important  effect on older  house- 
holds with the most substantial  housing  assets. 
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classified  as income, from corporate  control transactions.  These trans- 
actions totaled nearly $100 billion a year by the end of the decade, 
providing  a stimulus  to consumption  that does not show up as income. 
Household  surveys  may  include  capital  gains  as a component  of income, 
but they do not show the cash received by households when selling 
assets. The national  accounts  even exclude capital  gains  from  household 
income. If these cash receipts spur  consumption,  the saving  rate  will fall 
because there  will be no income flow corresponding  to these items. The 
time series correlation  between household cash receipts and real con- 
sumption levels is quite high, but is difficult to interpret  as causal.2 
Further  evidence on the importance  of this effect requires  careful  analy- 
sis of very high  income and high  wealth  households. 
The  most suggestive  finding  in the Bosworth,  Burtless,  and  Sabelhaus 
paper is that saving rates for homeowners have fallen by more than 
saving  rates for nonhomeowners.  This raises the important  question  of 
whether the 30 percent increase in real house values during  the 1970s 
could explain the low U.S. personal saving rate of the 1980s. Initially, 
one should  be clear  that  the benchmark  for the consumption  response  to 
housing  capital  gains  is substantially  smaller  than  for other  capital  gains. 
When  house prices rise, the user cost of housing  facing  households  rises 
too. If the household  lived  forever  and  was planning  to live in the current 
house forever, then the price appreciation  precisely offsets the higher 
user charges in perpetuity and there is no net effect on household 
spending. Only when a household plans to "trade down" to another 
unit, or to move to another  city with lower house prices, does a change 
in the local price correspond  to a windfall  gain. 
The disparity  between homeowner  and renter saving rates could be 
due either to unusually  low saving rates among  homeowners  or to high 
saving  rates among  renters.  This paper  suggests that saving  rates  for all 
groups  are low and have fallen, but the question is whether  changes in 
house prices have exacerbated the saving decline among owners or 
limited  the decline among  renters. A recent study of renter  saving  rates 
across cities3  finds convincing support  for the view that renter house- 
holds in high-house-price  cities save a higher  fraction of their income 
than  their  counterparts  in other  places. Higher  house prices  raise "target 
2.  Evidence  on this issue is provided  in Hatsopoulos,  Krugman,  and  Poterba  (1989). 
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saving" in this part of the life cycle, and thus may have contributed  to 
smaller-than-otherwise  declines in saving  rates  for renters. 
This paper's statistical evidence on housing capital gains and con- 
sumption is in effect a regression of the household saving rate on a 
dummy variable  for homeownership.  More refined  tests are possible, 
using for example the amount of housing gain available to different 
households.  A number  of previous  studies have tried  to identify  the link 
between  house prices  and  consumer  spending  using  such  tests. Jonathan 
Skinner's work is notable, since he uses the Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) data on estimated  house value and purchase  price to 
construct a measure of accrued capital gain.4 His work suggests a 
relatively  weak  link  between  the increase  in house values and  the decline 
of household saving. However, his analysis relies on the unfortunately 
limited  consumption  data of the PSID and focuses on the late 1970s, a 
period before the rapid  increase in second mortgages  and home equity 
credit lines. The findings  in the current study are a tantalizing  lure to 
further  research  in this area. 
The paper does disaggregate  homeowners by age and finds larger 
declines  in saving  rates  for  older  homeowner  households  than  for  younger 
ones. The evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances and the 
Consumer  Expenditure  Survey is somewhat contradictory  on whether 
the elderly  homeowners  have experienced  sharper  saving  declines than 
others, but both surveys suggest smaller saving changes for young 
homeowners than for those aged 45 and over. The largest potential 
effects of changing  house prices are for elderly households. More than 
85 percent  of U.S. households  own their  homes when they reach  age 60, 
and  most will have paid  off or nearly  paid  off their  mortgages. 
Several stylized facts nevertheless suggest relatively limited con- 
sumption responses among these groups. First, most of the "young 
elderly," those aged 65-74, tend to remain  in the house they owned at 
retirement.5  There is weak evidence that in the few years before death 
or after the death of a spouse, mobility rates increase. Second, when 
these households are offered the opportunity  to borrow against their 
homes, they show remarkably  little willingness  to do so. Trial  programs 
with reverse annuity  mortgages,  for example, suggest that households 
4.  Skinner  (1989). 
5. An important  data  source  on the housing  behavior  of the elderly  is Sheiner  and  Weil 
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wish to preserve their home equity. This suggests that housing wealth 
may be viewed as an imperfect  substitute  for other  types of wealth, and 
that  households  are  less likely  to use housing  wealth  to finance  retirement 
consumption. 
The links between housing, credit institutions,  and saving behavior 
could potentially be  identified by  analyzing household behavior in 
different  countries or even in different  parts of the United States, but 
such  research  will require  substantial  detail  on household  characteristics 
and circumstances. The present paper makes important  progress and 
will surely stimulate  further  work. 
Lawrence  H. Summers: This  paper  by Barry  Bosworth,  Gary  Burtless, 
and John Sabelhaus  is a terrific  example of a classic Brookings  genre: 
the study of ratios that have traditionally  been either declining or 
increasing  at a relatively steady rate. Almost always, the object of the 
study  is a ratio  of substantial  social consequence. Typically,  the authors 
first  observe that changes in the ratio  are not a figment  of measurement 
error.  The authors  usually  wonder  whether  movements  can  be explained 
through shifting composition within and across categories. Normally 
they find that more of the action occurs within categories than across 
categories. George Perry's work on the unemployment  rate is the ex- 
ception that proves this rule. These typical authors then consider a 
number  of strong  monocausal  explanations  that other economists have 
suggested;  they reject them point by point. They then observe that the 
phenomenon  is important,  but  somewhat  mysterious,  and  the discussion 
goes down in a blaze of amateur  sociology which attempts  to look for 
the general,  systemic, and  unfavorable  factor  that  has accounted  for the 
change. Knowledge is in the end enriched by the discussants, by the 
authors,  and  by the rejection  of the monocausal  explanations. 
I think  we are seeing  that  pattern  strengthen  as time  passes. Computer 
technology has marched  on and data have become more available.  The 
odds that microdata will play a role in the rejection process have 
increased.  That  is the case here today. 
I want to talk  first  about  five hypotheses that  the authors,  in one way 
or another,  touch on and subsequently  reject. Then I would like to talk 
about some possible explanations  that may account for the decline in 
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Before doing  that, I would note parenthetically  that  the authors  point 
out something  important,  a fact that anyone examining  these microdata 
should notice: while macroeconomists  have taken to conceptualizing 
the  study of  consumption behavior in terms of  permanent-income 
individuals  and other, liquidity-constrained,  individuals,  who spend all 
their income each year, a look at the microdata reveals that this 
hypothesis is all wrong. First, hardly  any families spend exactly their 
income; and second, there is an enormous  range  of variation  in saving, 
which means that the nonpermanent-income  people should not be 
modeled  as people who spend  their  entire  income. 
Turning  to the subjects that the authors take up, I first look at the 
demography  side. The authors  make  a point  that has been made  before, 
that  a Perry-weighted  saving  rate  looks the same  as a regular  saving  rate. 
Yet the idea that the aging of the population  could matter seems sup- 
ported by saving behavior in Asian countries, which have little social 
support  for the elderly. 
David Weil has proposed an interesting  reconciliation  of those two 
ideas.  ' His research  suggests that there is a kind of general  equilibrium 
effect that has to be taken  into account. In a population  where there  are 
many  65-year-olds,  there  may also be many  39-year-olds  who think  they 
will be getting  bequests soon, and  are  consuming  in anticipation  of them. 
There may also be many 39-year-olds  who are taking  care of their aged 
parents  and are feeling the burden  of that. And there may be a lot of 65- 
year-olds  who are making  gifts to their  grandchildren. 
Weil provides some evidence that is consistent with this view of 
important  intergenerational  bequests. It is one possible rationalization 
for the negative demographic  finding,  but it is a demographic  channel 
that  the authors  do not explore. 
Some people have argued  that the baby boom generation  will save 
more as they move into a high saving age, and that, therefore, national 
saving is going to rise seven or eight years from now. My best guess is 
that  the change  in demographic  composition  will not have a large  impact 
on the saving  rate. 
Turning  to another  subject  the authors  consider, housing,  I think  Jim 
Poterba  got the microeconomics  of this basically right  in the foregoing 
discussion. The key point is to recognize that there is a difference 
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between my house going up relative to everybody else's house and all 
houses going up. If all houses go up and you are determined  to live in a 
house, that is not such good news and should  not be expected to lead to 
a large  increase  in the saving  rate. 
At one point Chris  Carroll  and  I looked at the Consumer  Expenditure 
Survey  without  the refinements  the authors  have made-it  was therefore 
much cruder data. We looked at whether there had been important 
changes  in saving  rates  in the Midwest  relative  to the coastal  parts  of the 
country,  with a view toward  seeing whether  housing  prices were impor- 
tant  to saving. We found no evidence to support  that hypothesis. 
In Japan,  it is commonly  said  that  house prices  are so high  that  people 
have to save to buy a house and that high house prices are therefore  an 
explanation  for high saving  rates. I think  it is a mistake  to suppose that 
there is any obvious link there. Furthermore,  if I understand  the facts, 
real house prices in the United States had their  most dramatic  period  of 
increase in the late 1970s,  not during  the 1980s.  So, the timing  evidence 
is not quite right  for house prices to explain  the low saving rate. Rather 
than focusing on the role of house prices, it might be more fruitful  to 
emphasize those changes in capital markets  that allow more people to 
take second houses and to buy houses with lower downpayments- 
developments  that  have changed  people's ability  to borrow. 
In a somewhat  related  vein, I was surprised  that  we were not  reminded 
that a low saving rate in the 1980s  had coincided with record high real 
interest  rates. It is fair  to observe that, if a mystery  factor  has caused the 
decline in saving  rates, one would expect to see a pattern  in which real 
interest  rates  rose and  the saving  rate  fell. Because it has been supposed 
that some mystery  factor has been reducing  saving, one would not take 
that pattern  as evidence that a ceteribus  paribus change in real interest 
rates might  be having  an effect on saving  rates. 
In yet another  potential  explanation,  the authors  discuss the acceler- 
ator  notion  in  connection  with  saving,  which  is very  appealing.  However, 
it does not have-and  the authors  do not give it-much  of a microeco- 
nomic foundation  in terms of preferences  and utility functions and the 
like. One is tempted by the view that if saving has a precautionary 
character, income growth will map into a change in saving rates. Of 
course, how large a precautionary  balance I want to have on hand  will 
depend  upon what my expected future  income prospects are. So, while 
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story  in terms  of microeconomic  preferences.  Furthermore,  the fact that 
capital gains seem to have relatively little to do with saving behavior 
poses a problem for the view that the target wealth-income ratio is 
important  to saving,  or at least that  it is important  at all levels of income. 
On  the growth-saving  nexus, there  seem to be at least two ideas  worth 
considering  when explaining  why growth  and  private  saving  go together 
to the extent they do. One is that  the rate  of growth  of income may  affect 
the target  growth  rate of consumption.  If my aspirations  for when I am 
65 years old are to live as well as a 40-year-old  professor lives, rather 
than have some absolute standard  of living in mind, an increase in the 
growth  rate  of consumption  may increase  my saving  rate. 
An alternative  notion, supporting  the same conclusion, is that  people 
are very slow to adjust  their standard  of living; and that when income 
growth  is fast, people respond  like first-year  assistant  professors-they 
still look like graduate students and they have high saving rates. In 
countries  where  income  is growing  rapidly,  that  is what  always happens; 
a lot, therefore,  have high saving  rates. 
I do not think we have a firm story for this accelerator notion of 
saving, and I am not sure  just how hard  we should  look. I was surprised 
when I examined, a couple of years ago, cross-country  evidence and 
found that  the strong  relationship  between the slowdown in growth  and 
the change in the national saving rate was heavily driven by deficits, 
rather  than by private saving. When one looks at private saving, that 
relationship  is not strong.  The United States has actually  not undergone 
one of the larger  slowdowns in the world. Yet it has undergone  one of 
the larger  slowdowns in private  saving. 
Finally, to highlight  one of the things that is implicit  in the authors' 
discussion, the evil-1980s hypothesis finds little comfort in these data. 
There is the loose notion that all the junk bonds, all the restructuring, 
and all the realizing  of capital gains are responsible for the decline in 
saving.  The cross-country  data suggest, however, that  busy investment 
bankers  are  not the  primary  cause for  what  has  been happening  to saving. 
The pattern  of declining  saving  is common  to other  countries  and, more 
importantly,  it is common  among  young people and people in the lower 
parts  of the income distribution,  who are quite unlikely  to be receiving 
takeover  premiums  or interest  on  junk bonds. 
What general hypotheses might explain the movements in saving? 
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Carroll  and I presented  a couple of years ago-which  I still think  has a 
lot to do with what is going on, although  it is difficult  to prove-is  that 
progress  means that people have less to worry about  than  they used to, 
and because they have less to worry about they have a lower need to 
save.2 Twenty-five years ago the poverty rate among the elderly was 
twice what it is today: then, the poverty of older Americans  was twice 
the rate of younger  citizens. Today, the poverty rate is higher  for those 
under  65 than  for those over 65. My guess is that  many  more  people form 
a view about  retirement  by looking  at whether  their  parents  seem rich  or 
poor, than  by looking  at the report  of the social security  actuaries. 
In the same vein, the incidence of life insurance  is larger  than  what it 
once was. Also, ability  to borrow  for short-term  credit  is greater  than  it 
once was. It seems plausible  that, in general,  people have less to worry 
about, and, therefore,  they feel less need to save. 
A second related  hypothesis  is that  better  capital  markets  mean  fewer 
people are liquidity constrained and more people can borrow. As a 
consequence, the people who are less liquidity  constrained  are consum- 
ing more, and  their saving  rate  is lower. 
If I understand  the nature  of the authors' data, this is potentially  a 
testable hypothesis. If this hypothesis were wrong and if the general 
tone that the authors maintain is correct, one would expect that a 
symmetric  distribution  of saving  rates would have simply  slid to the left 
in the 1980s.  If, on the other  hand,  the capital  markets  have changed  and 
people are  more  likely  to borrow,  an elongation  of the negative  tail  would 
appear and would account for a significant part of the movement. 
Unfortunately  my guess is that it will not be possible to prove whether 
the shape of the distribution  has changed. 
Finally, I would like to allude  to some findings  by Joel Slemrod.3  His 
rather  straightforward  hypothesis-which  he explores using cross-sec- 
tional and time-series data-is  that people's feeling of security has 
something  to do with  the amount  that  they save. He puts  this hypothesis, 
however, to an unconventional  test: he shows that saving behavior is 
correlated with both time-series and cross-sectional measures of the 
perceived likelihood of nuclear war. The time series is the changing 
prospect of  nuclear war as  measured by the Union of  Concerned 
2.  Carroll  and  Summers  (1989). 
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Scientists. The cross-sectional data are the findings  of public opinion 
polls in several countries  on the likelihood  of nuclear  war. 
Obviously, his findings  do not fit with the usual idea about how and 
why people save.  I would add, however, as  very weak anecdotal 
evidence, the prominent  economist who once worked in the Pentagon 
and  who announced  to my parents  in 1960  that  he did not have a pension 
because, given the prospect of nuclear  war, he did not think he would 
be around  to enjoy it. Presumably  he has reformed  his behavior, since 
he will soon be needing  his pension after  all. 
Is it less plausible  to believe that  many  people save less because they 
think  there will be a nuclear  war, than  to believe that many  people save 
more because they anticipate  that their children  will be more heavily 
burdened  by the government  debt? The latter hypothesis, for which I 
think  it is difficult  to produce  graphs  as compelling  as Slemrod's, seems 
to have been taken  very seriously. Why  not give some more  credence  to 
a proven statistical relationship  between saving and the prospect of 
nuclear  war? 
General Discussion 
Several of the panelists thought that the saving decline across age 
groups was less uniform  than suggested by the authors. George Perry 
and Robert Gordon observed that tables 3 and 5 show a much faster 
decline in saving in the 45-and-older  age groups. They suggested that 
focusing on the distinctive characteristics  of this group  might  be infor- 
mative. Gordon observed that young people save for rainy days or 
downpayments  and thus have short horizons while older people are 
saving for retirement. Hence saving in different  age groups might be 
expected to  differ in response-for  example, to  changes in  social 
security. William Brainard  agreed and noted that many individuals 
attempt  to achieve a level of retirement  income proportional  to their 
preretirement  income. In that case a slowdown in growth and higher 
interest  rates  would help explain  a decline in saving  for retirement. 
Christopher  Sims observed that the ability  of the life-cycle model to 
explain the decline in saving depends upon whether GNP growth is 
better modeled  as stationary  fluctuations  around  trend or drifting  non- 
stationarity.  While  the authors  treat  the low growth  of the late 1970s  and 252  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
1980s as anticipated, it is not clear that a rational  person in the late 
seventies would have done so. It would have been natural  for him to 
assume that a few years of slow growth  were bad luck and that income 
would return  to trend. Since the level of saving would fall with income 
below trend, a period of slow growth would be expected to have low 
saving. This effect would be compounded  by lifestyle inertia. People 
make  commitments  to houses, cars, private  schools, and  so on that  make 
it costly to change consumption  rapidly. Sims noted that this explana- 
tion of the decline in saving  would predict  an eventual return  to higher 
levels  of  saving as  the  slow  growth is  accepted  as  permanent, 
in contrast to the authors' accelerator explanation, which predicts a 
permanent  decline in saving  with lower growth. 
William  Nordhaus observed that whereas the data show a greater 
decline in saving in the oldest age group than in the younger ones, 
explanations  of the decline in saving  based on, for example, the income 
effect of a rise in interest  rates, to the extent that  they are part  of a zero- 
bequest  life-cycle model, would  predict  that  saving  should  go down  least 
in  the oldest  group.  Changes  in lifetime  income  expectations  should  have 
an effect proportional  to the fraction  of the lifetime  remaining.  The only 
explanations  that predict a comparable  decline across age groups are 
clan-type  arguments  in which individuals  behave as if they are infinitely 
long-lived. 
Nordhaus  also expressed some concern about the sensitivity of the 
results  to the imputations  and adjustments  necessary to get from  a cash 
concept of saving  to a national  income  accounts  concept. The peaks and 
troughs  can be changed  and  the saving  rate  decline can even be made  to 
disappear  by appropriate  readjustments.  He also noted that  while many 
countries  experienced  declines in saving after 1973,  they do not have a 
great  deal of cyclical coincidence. 
The coincidence of the peaks in Canadian  saving and oil shocks led 
Gordon  to suggest that the decline in saving may be due to heightened 
inflationary  expectations  and  anxieties  about  the future.  He cited a paper 
by Thomas Juster and Paul Wachtel (BPEA,  1:1972) which suggested 
that an increase in inflation  raises saving as people compensate  for the 
erosion  of real  wealth. A decline  in inflationary  expectations  in the 1980s 
would  be expected to reduce saving. 
James Tobin reported  the results of a recent survey of the Harvard 
class of 1939  that illuminated  the saving  behavior  of the elderly. While Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless, and John Sabelhaus  253 
they are an affluent  group, the behavior  of the affluent  is an important 
determinant  of overall saving. They were all expecting to live on their 
pensions and never touch any other part of their wealth, which they 
planned  to leave to their  children.  There  seemed  to be very little  concern 
about living so long, and in such a decrepit condition, that they would 
not be able to manage  their  medical  expenses. They did not expect they 
would ever need to ask their  children  for any help. 
Robert Litan presented two  pieces  of  evidence against and for 
Lawrence  Summers's  contention  that  people feel more secure now than 
they did 10 to 15 years ago. There is an abundance  of survey evidence 
that young people no longer think they will receive social security 
benefits  when they retire  and  there have been cutbacks  at the state level 
in unemployment  insurance.  He noted, however, that  there  is much  less 
stigma now attached to personal and corporate bankruptcy, so that 
individuals  may borrow  more and save less, taking  greater  bankruptcy 
risk. 
Martin  Baily noted that family dissolution has a significant  negative 
impact  on saving.  He asked if changes  in family  structure  could account 
for some of the decline. Baily also noted that  the perceived  likelihood  of 
nuclear  war is really only correlated  with saving from 1965  to 1970;  at 
other times the fit is not that good. Nordhaus  mentioned  that a political 
scientist  who investigated  the process by which  the degrees  of likelihood 
are determined  found a significant  ratchet effect. The clock is turned 
forward  whenever  anything  exacerbates  international  tensions,  but  there 
is a reluctance  to turn  it back when tensions cease. 254  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
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